


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THUCYDIDES.

BOOK IV.

A TRANSLATION.






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
BOOK IV.

A TRANSLATION.

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THUCYDIDES.

BOOK IV.

A TRANSLATION.

I.—1. IN the following summer, when the corn was coming into ear, ten ships of the Syracusans set sail with an equal number of Locrian ships, and seized Messene, in Sicily, at the invitation of the inhabitants. Thus Messene fell off from the Athenians. 2. The Syracusans did this chiefly because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and through fear of the Athenians, lest, making it their base of operations at some future time, they should attack them with a greater armament. The Locrians acted from hatred of the Rhegians, wishing to completely reduce them by warlike operations on both sides. 3. The Locrians had made an incursion at the same time into the Rhegians' country in full force, to prevent their going to the assistance of the Messenians, induced at the same time by some Rhegian exiles, who were with them; for Rhegium had been for a long time in a state of faction, and it was impossible at the moment to repel the Locrians; wherefore they attacked them with greater determination. 4. The Locrians withdrew with their land force after committing depredations, but the ships still kept watch on Messene; and others that were being manned were intended to take up their station in the harbour and carry on the war thence.

II.—1. About the same period of the spring, before the corn was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their

allies invaded Attica under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, King of the Lacedæmonians, and, establishing themselves there, began to ravage the country. 2. The Athenians despatched to Sicily the forty ships which, as we have said, were being fitted for sea, and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for Pythodorus, the third of their number, had gone on in front and already arrived in Sicily. 3. They gave instructions to these to sail along the coast, and look after the Coreyraens in the city, who were exposed to the plundering attacks of the exiles in the mountain. Sixty ships of the Peloponnesians had sailed to the spot, along the coast, as a support to those on the mountain; for, owing to the great scarcity in the city, they thought they should easily get matters into their own hands. Demosthenes had no command after the retreat from Acarnania, and to him they gave instructions, at his own request, to employ these ships if he liked in the neighbourhood of Peloponnesus.

III.—1. When they came, in their voyage, off the coast of Laconia, and learnt that the ships of the Peloponnesians were already at Coreyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for pressing on to Coreyra; while Demosthenes desired them first to touch at Pylos, and to do what was necessary before continuing their voyage; and while they were making objections, a storm happened to come on which carried their ships into Pylos. 2. Demosthenes immediately requested them to fortify the place, for he had joined the expedition for this purpose, and he pointed out the great abundance of wood and stone, and also the fact that it was strong by nature and uninhabited, as was a considerable stretch of the neighbouring district; for Pylos is about 400 stadia distant from Sparta, and is in ground which was formerly Messenian; the Lacedæmonians call it Coryphasium. 3. The other two said there were plenty of desert headlands in Peloponnesus, if he wished to put the state to expense by occupying them. But, in his opinion, this post had an importance beyond any other, as there was a harbour close by, and because that the Messenians, being connected with it of old, and speaking the same dialect as the Lacedæmonians, were likely to do great injury by making raids

from the place, and would at the same time be reliable guardians of the post.

IV.—1. As he made no way in persuading either the generals or the soldiers, and afterwards when he communicated his plans to the taxiarchs also, he remained inactive owing to stress of weather, until the soldiers themselves, having nothing to do, were seized with an impulse to station themselves round the spot and fortify it. 2. So they took the matter in hand and worked, and as they had no masons' tools, they brought stones as they picked them up, and put them together as each happened to fit; whenever there was occasion to use clay, for lack of hods they carried it on their backs, stooping to the position in which it was most likely to keep its place, and joining their hands behind them to prevent its falling off. 3. In every way they were eager to anticipate the Lacedæmonians by having completed the most assailable parts before they could come to the rescue; for the greater part of the position was strong of itself, and had no need of a fortification.

V.—1. Now, the other side happened to be celebrating some festival, and on hearing the news they regarded it with indifference, thinking that when they took the field either the Athenians would not await their onset, or that they would easily take the place by force; in some degree, too, the fact that their army was still at Athens detained them. 2. The Athenians, after fortifying in six days the landward part of the position and that which most needed it, left Demosthenes there with five ships to keep guard; but with the greater number of their ships they hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

VI.—1. The Peloponnesians who were in Attica, directly they heard of the occupation of Pylos, withdrew homewards with all speed, for they thought—at least, the Lacedæmonians and Agis, the king, did—that the Pylos incident nearly concerned them; besides, they had made their incursion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, so that they wanted sustenance for the rank and file; and wintry weather coming on beyond what was usual for the season caused disasters in their army. 2. Thus many causes conspired to hasten their return, and to make their

invasion a very short one; for they stayed only fifteen days in Attica.

VII.—About the same time Simonides, a general of the Athenians, getting together a few Athenians from the military posts, and a large body of the allies in that part, seized Eion, on the borders of Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, but hostile, which was betrayed to him; however, as the Chalcidians and Botiæans immediately came to the rescue, he was beaten out of the place with the loss of many of his soldiers.

VIII.—1. When the Peloponnesians from Attica retreated, the Spartans themselves, and those of the Pericæci who were in the immediate neighbourhood, at once marched to the rescue of Pylos; but the advance of the other Lacedæmonians was proceeding more slowly, as they had but just arrived from the other expedition. 2. So they sent round word throughout Peloponnesus to bring aid as quickly as possible to Pylos; they sent also to the sixty ships belonging to them at Corcyra, and these reached Pylos by being dragged over the isthmus of Leucadia, and so giving the slip to the Attic ships at Zacynthus; the land force was already at hand. 3. While the Peloponnesians were still sailing up, Demosthenes was beforehand with them, and secretly sent two ships with a message to Eurymedon, and the Athenians on board the ships at Zacynthus, to come up, as the place was in danger. 4. The ships then were sailing with all speed, according to the instructions sent by Demosthenes; the Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, were making preparations with the intention of assaulting the fort both by land and sea, hoping that they would easily take a work erected in haste, and containing but few men. 5. Looking also to the probability of relief by the Attic ships from Zacynthus, they intended, if they should fail previously to take the place, also to block up the entrances to the harbour, that it might be impossible for the Athenians to sail in and come to anchor there. 6. For the island called Sphacteria, stretching along the front, and lying close off the land, makes the harbour secure, and its entrances narrow, leaving on the one side a passage for two ships by the Athenians'

port and Pylos, and on the other for eight or nine close to the other mainland; it was entirely covered with wood, and pathless, owing to its desert condition, and in length it was about fifteen stadia, as nearly as may be. 7. They intended, therefore, to bar the entrances with their ships, having their prows to the enemy, and packed closely together; but having their fears about this island, lest the enemy should make war upon them from it, they transported some hoplites into it, and ranged others along the mainland; for thus (they thought), both the island would be hostile to the Athenians, and the mainland, which did not admit of landing; for the coast of Pylos itself, outside the entrance, towards the open sea, being harbourless, would not afford them a base whence they could start to help their own men, and they themselves would, in all probability, storm the place without the risk of a sea-fight, since there were no provisions in it, and it had been occupied with but slight preparation. 9. Having resolved upon these measures, they conveyed the hoplites across to the island, selecting them by lot from all the *lochi*. Some others had gone over before in successive detachments, but those who went last and were caught there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots attached to them; their commander was Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

IX.—1. When Demosthenes saw that the Lacedæmonians intended to attack him by sea as well as by land, he also began his preparations; he dragged up under the fort the triremes he had remaining from those that were left him, secured them with a stockade, and armed their crews with shields of an inferior kind, and mostly made of osiers; for it was not possible in a lonely place to provide themselves with arms, and even these they got from a piratical thirty-oared boat and a cutter belonging to some Messenians, who happened to have come up; and there were hoplites from among these Messenians, amounting to about forty, whom he employed along with the rest. 2. The bulk, therefore, of his men, both those without full arms and those who were armed, he posted at those points of the position that were most fortified and secure towards the mainland, instructing them beforehand to repel the land forces if they

should attempt an assault ; but he himself, selecting for his own use from the whole body sixty hoplites and a few bowmen, went outside the wall to a point on the sea at which he had the greatest expectation that they would try to land, namely, on ground difficult to be sure and rocky, looking towards the open sea ; still, as their own wall was very weak at this point, he thought they would be drawn on to eagerness for the attack ; for, as they themselves never looked forward to being overpowered at sea, they built a wall of no great strength, while if the other side forced a landing the place became at once easy to take. 3. At this point, therefore, he went to the very edge of the sea, drawing up his men so as to prevent a landing if he could, and exhorted them as follows :

X.—1. ‘My men, sharers with me in this danger, let no one of you in such a strait as this wish to seem a quick-witted fellow, reckoning up all the danger that surrounds us, but rather to close with the enemy in a mood of uncalculating hopefulness, and therefore likely to come out successful from this danger too ; for whenever matters have reached a critical point as now, they least admit of calculation, but require to be put to the most speedy hazard. 2. For my part I see the balance of advantage to be on our side, if we choose to stand our ground, and not through being stunned by their numbers to give up entirely the advantage we have to start with. 3. For the fact that the ground is hard to gain a footing on I take to be in our favour, as, while we remain, it proves an aid to us ; but if we retreat, it will, though difficult, be easy enough with no one in the way, and we shall find the enemy all the more terrible for not having an easy retreat, supposing also that he is hard pressed by us ; for while on board their ships they are very easy to repel, but when they have landed they are at once on equal terms with us. There is also no need to be too much afraid of their superior numbers ; though numerous, they will fight a few at a time, owing to the difficulty of coming to land, and it is not an army on land fighting under like conditions with superiority of force, but from ships, for which many lucky incidents on the water must combine (if they are to be effective). 4. Thus

I consider their difficulties to be a set-off to the smallness of our force; and at the same time I call upon you, Athenians as you are, and knowing by experience what a landing from ships in the face of others is—namely, that if a man were to stand his ground, and not retire through fright at the splashing among the breakers and the terrible look of the ships nearing the land, he will never be overpowered—in your turn now to stand your ground, and by beating them off along the line of surf to ensure your own safety and that of the place.’

XI.—1. When Demosthenes had given them such exhortation, the Athenians plucked up courage, and, marching down in face of the enemy, ranged themselves along the seashore. 2. The Lacedæmonians, having got under way, attacked the fort with their land force and with their ships as well, to the number of forty-three: the commander on board of them was Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan; and he made the attack just where Demosthenes was expecting him. 3. The Athenians repelled the attack in both quarters, both on land and on the sea; their opponents, dividing their ships into small detachments, because it was not possible to come to land with more at a time, kept sailing up against them, relieving one another in turn, bringing into play all their eagerness and mutual encouragement, to try if they could anyhow force a passage and capture the fort. The most conspicuous of them all was Brasidas; (4) for being in command of a trireme, and seeing that, because the ground was difficult, the trierarchs and steersmen, even if it seemed possible to land anywhere, were shy and careful of their ships lest they should stave them in, he called out loudly that it was not seemly to be sparing of timber and look on idly when the enemy had set up a fort in their country, but he bade them break their ships to splinters so long as they forced a landing, and told the allies not to be reluctant to give up their ships as an offering to the Lacedæmonians at the present crisis, in return for their great benefits, but to run their ships aground, and somehow or other to effect a landing so as to make themselves masters both of the men and of the place.

XII.—1. While spurring on the rest in this style, he

forced his own steersman to run the ship ashore, and was stepping on to the gangway ; on trying to land he was cut down by the Athenians, and, receiving several wounds, he fainted. As he himself fell into the clear space beyond the rowers, his shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being borne to land, the Athenians picked it up and used it for the trophy which they erected as a memorial of this attack. 2. The rest, notwithstanding their eagerness, were unable to land because of the difficulty of the place, and the firmness with which the Athenians stood their ground without giving way at all. 3. Fortune took this strange turn, that Athenians fighting on land, and that, too, Laconian land, were repelling their adversaries coming against them by sea, and that Lacedæmonians were trying to effect a landing from ships in the face of Athenians, and upon their own land, which was for the time in the hands of the enemy ; for it formed the chief part of their glory in those days, that the one side were mainly landsmen, and most powerful in land battles, whereas the other side were seamen, and had the chief advantage in their ships.

XIII.—1. After continuing their attacks throughout this day and a part of the next, they had quite stopped, and on the third day they sent some of their ships along the coast to Asine to fetch timber for engines, hoping that though the wall by the harbour was of considerable height, yet, as there was there the best chance of landing, they would take it with engines. 2. Meanwhile the ships of the Athenians from Zacynthus came up to the number of fifty, for they had been reinforced by some of the guardships from Naupactus and four Chian vessels. 3. When they saw the mainland crowded with hoplites, and the island also, and that the ships were in the harbour and not attempting to sail out, they were at a loss where to come to anchor. So for the time they sailed to the island Prote, which was uninhabited, and not far off, and bivouacked on it. The next day they set sail prepared for action, if the others chose to sail out against them into good sea-room ; otherwise with the intention of sailing in against them themselves. Their opponents did not set out against them, and, as it happened, they had not carried out their intention of blocking up the entrances ; so

they remained quiet on the land, went on manning their ships, and preparing, if anyone sailed in, to engage inside the harbour, as it was of considerable extent.

XIV.—1. The Athenians, perceiving this, started to attack them at either entrance, and falling upon the greater number of the ships which were already afloat, and with their prows towards them, they put them to flight, and pursuing them closely, as was natural from the short distance, they damaged several, and took five—one, crew and all. The rest had taken refuge on the land by running aground, but they dashed into them; those that were being manned were disabled before they could get under way; some they were lashing to their own and towing away without their crews, who had started off in flight. The Lacedæmonians seeing this and feeling distressed at the disaster, because in fact it was their men that were being cut off upon the island, ran along to the rescue, and going into the sea with their heavy arms they began to lay hold on the ships and tug them the other way, each one thinking that the work was at a standstill wherever he himself was not present. 3. The confusion which ensued was great, a complete reversal of the method habitual to either side with regard to the ships; for the Lacedæmonians, in their zeal and dismay, were, so to speak, just exactly carrying on a seafight on land, while the Athenians, having the best of the fight and wishing to push their present advantage to its full extent, were carrying on a landfight from ships. 4. After giving each other much trouble and inflicting many wounds they parted, and the Lacedæmonians carried off their empty ships in safety, except those which were first taken. 5. Now either side betook themselves to their encampment. The one party set up a trophy, gave up the dead, took possession of the wrecks, and began sailing round the island to keep watch upon it, looking upon the men as completely cut off; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, having now come to the rescue from all quarters, remained in their place over against Pylos.

XV.—1. As soon as word was brought to Sparta of what had happened at Pylos, it was resolved, as in face of a great disaster, that the authorities should go down to the

camp, and immediately advise what seemed best after a personal inspection. 2. Seeing that it was impossible to succour their men, and being unwilling to incur the risk either of their suffering the extremity of hunger or of being mastered by overpowering numbers, they resolved to make a truce with the generals of the Athenians, if they were willing, as far as concerned Pylos, and then to send ambassadors to Athens to treat for an arrangement, so as to get their men off as quickly as they could.

XVI.—1. The generals accepting the proposition, a truce was made on the following terms: the Lacedæmonians to bring to Pylos and give up to the Athenians the ships in which they had fought, and all on Laconian ground that were ships of war, and to abstain from any attack on the fort either by land or sea; the Athenians to allow the Lacedæmonians on the mainland to send out to their men on the island a fixed quantity of bread ready kneaded, viz., two Attic *choenices* of barley-meal with two *cotylæ* of wine and meat, and to each servant the half of this; that they should send these in in sight of the Athenians, and that no vessel should sail in secretly; the Athenians to keep just as strict a watch on the island, with the exception of not landing, and not to make an attack on the Peloponnesian army either by land or sea; (2) if either party should transgress any point whatsoever of these stipulations, the truce to be at that moment at an end; the truce to be considered in force until the ambassadors from the Lacedæmonians to Athens should return; the Athenians to convey them in a trireme and bring them back; on their arrival the truce to be at an end, and the Athenians to give up the ships in the condition in which they received them. 3. The truce, then, was made on these terms: the ships were given up, amounting to about sixty, and the ambassadors were sent off. On their arrival at Athens they spoke as follows:

XVII.—1. The ‘Lacedæmonians have sent us, men of Athens, to effect with regard to the men on the island whatever arrangement we may prevail upon you to regard as advantageous to you, and is likely to bring most credit to us in our misfortune, as far as present circumstances admit. We shall protract our speech somewhat in length, not in

breach of our habitual practice, but because it is the custom of our country to abstain indeed from using many words when a few are sufficient, yet to make a longer speech when there is an opportunity of accomplishing our purpose by giving useful information in words. 3. Do you receive them not in a hostile spirit, nor as if your want of sense was being instructed, but regarding them as a suggestion for sound deliberation addressed to well-informed men. For you have the opportunity of turning your present luck to account, keeping what you have got, and getting honour and glory in addition, and of escaping the fate of men who get something good in an unusual way; for they always reach in hope after something greater because their present position is unexpectedly fortunate: (5) while those who have met with most changes either way are justly very mistrustful of prosperity, and this might reasonably be the case with your city, on account of your great experience, and with ourselves.

XVIII.—1. 'Learn this further by fixing your eyes upon misfortunes of us who are come to you, though in the enjoyment of a very great prestige among the Greeks, and formerly thinking that we had a superior's right to grant what we now come to you to ask. 2. Yet we did not meet with the mishap from failure of power, nor yet from an overweening sense of a greater accession to it, but from tripping in our judgment while relying on our ordinary resources—a point in which the same fate occurs alike to all. 3. Wherefore it is not proper for you, on account of the present strength of your city and the advances it has made, to think that the course of fortune too will always be on your side. 4. They are men of sound judgment who seek security by reckoning their successes as doubtful—the same men, by the way, would deal more sensibly with disasters—and consider that war is on the side of a man, not as he chooses to take a greater or less share in it, but as the changes of fortune lead them. Men of this kind, being least likely to trip because they are not elated through confidence in their successful conduct of the war, would in the hour of prosperity be most ready to come to terms. 5. It is well for you, Athenians, to deal thus with us now,

and so—if, refusing compliance, you should meet with disaster, of which there are many possible chances—to avoid hereafter being thought to have won your present advantages by mere luck, when it was in your power to leave behind you a reputation for strength and good sense exposed to no risk.

XIX.—1. ‘Now, the Lacedæmonians invite you to a truce and conclusion of the war, making the offer that peace and alliance, and in other respects complete friendship and familiar intercourse, should subsist between the two nations, and asking in return the restoration of the men on the island, and thinking it better for both sides to run no extreme risk, whether they should forcibly make their escape through the chance appearance of some way of safety, or if, after being reduced to surrender, they should come entirely into your power. 2. We think that violent enmities would be most surely put an end to, not in the case in which one party after defending himself and gaining the upper hand in most points of the war should compulsorily bind his opponent by oaths and make an unfair agreement, but when a man, though it is in his power to do the same, yet in a spirit of moderation and having conquered his enemy, with a display of generosity should be reconciled to him on terms that are moderate in comparison with what he expected. 4. For his adversary being already bound not to retaliate, as one who has been beaten by force, but to make a return of generosity, is more ready for very shame to abide by that to which he has agreed. 4. Men act thus more towards their bitter enemies than towards those who have only moderate differences with them, and are naturally disposed to yield in turn to those who willingly give in, but against overweening assumption to risk everything even against their judgment.

XX.—1. ‘So reconciliation is well for both of us, if ever it was, before any irremediable disaster overtake us in the interval, in which case we must of necessity entertain an eternal hatred to you both in general and in particular, and you be deprived of that to which we now invite you. 2. While things are still undecided, and while renown is offered to you as well as friendship with us—our disaster

being settled on moderate terms before any dishonour befalls us—let us be reconciled; thus let us ourselves choose peace instead of war, and cause a cessation of troubles to the rest of the Greeks. 3. Moreover, they will regard you as the chief agents in this transaction, for they are at war among themselves, without knowing clearly which side begun; but if a settlement is made—the decision of which rests mainly with you—they will set their gratitude to your account. 4. If you decide thus, you have the opportunity of becoming friendly to the Lacedæmonians on a sure footing, at their own invitation, and doing them a favour rather than forcing anything upon them. Consider, also, what advantages are likely to be involved in this course; for if we and you hold the same language, be sure that the rest of the Hellenic community, being inferior in power, will do us the greatest honour.’

XXI.—1. Thus much, then, the Lacedæmonians said, thinking that on a previous occasion the Athenians desired a truce, but were hindered by their opposition, and that when peace was offered they would gladly accept it and give back the men. 2. But they, as they had the men on the island, thought that the treaty was already prepared for them, whenever they chose to make it with them, and they were reaching after something more. 3. They were especially egged on by Cleon, the son of Cleænetus, who was a popular leader at that time, and most influential with the multitude. He persuaded them to answer, that the men on the island must first give up themselves and their arms, and be conveyed to Athens; that when they came, the Lacedæmonians, upon giving up Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia, which they got, not in war, but in accordance with the former agreement—the Athenians having made concessions under the pressure of calamity and because they were at the time rather in need of a truce—should get back their men and make a truce for as long a time as seemed good to both parties.

XXII.—1. With respect to the answer they made no reply, but desired them to choose delegates to confer with them, who, by saying and hearing what was to be said on each point, should quietly come to an agreement according

as they should prevail upon one another. 2. Then, indeed, Cleon inveighed against them vehemently, saying that he perceived even before that they had no just intention, and that now it was manifest, since they were unwilling to say anything before the multitude, but wished to get into conference with a few men. But if they had any salutary intention, he bade them speak out to all. 3. The Lacedæmonians, seeing that it was not possible for them to speak in full assembly, even though under the pressure of disaster they did resolve to make some concession, lest they should be traduced to their allies as having spoken and failed, and seeing that the Athenians would not do in a spirit of fairness what they invited them to do, retired from Athens without accomplishing their purpose.

XXIII.—1. Immediately on their arrival the truce at Pylos came to an end, and the Lacedæmonians claimed the return of their ships, as had been agreed; but the Athenians, having as a ground of complaint an assault on the fort, in violation of the truce, and other matters seemingly not worth mention, refused to restore them, stoutly asserting, what, indeed, had already been said, that if any breach whatever took place the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians disputed the point, and, reproaching them with injustice with regard to the ships, went away and assumed a hostile attitude. 2. The warlike operations about Pylos were carried on by both sides with their full strength, the Athenians sailing round the island with two ships in contrary directions by day; while by night all, without exception, lay anchored round it, except on the side towards the open sea whenever there was a wind; and twenty ships arrived from Athens to help them in keeping guard, so that in all they amounted to seventy; and the Peloponnesians, forming an encampment on the mainland and making attacks upon the fort, looked out for any opportunity that might occur to save their men.

XXIV.—1. Meanwhile the Syracusans in Sicily, and their allies, in addition to the ships on guard at Messene, brought up the rest of the fleet which they were preparing, and carried on the war from Messene as a base; urged on especially by the Locrians, from hatred to the Rhegians,

whose territory they themselves had invaded *en masse*. 3. They wished also to try the issue of a sea-fight, seeing that the ships on the spot belonging to the Athenians were few in number, and learning that the greater number which were intended to come there were now engaged in the blockade of the island. 4. For if they gained the upper hand with their fleet, they hoped that they should easily subdue Rhegium with their land force and by blockading it with their ships, and that their cause was already becoming strong; for as the promontory of Rhegium in Italy, and that of Messene in Sicily, lay near together, it would not be possible for the Athenians to lie over against them and command the strait. 5. Now, the strait is the part of the sea between Rhegium and Messene, where Sicily is at the shortest distance from the mainland, and this is what is called Charybdis, where Ulysses is said to have sailed through; and on account of its narrowness, and from the sea rushing into it from two great mains, the Tyrrhenian and Sicilian, with strong currents, it was naturally considered difficult of navigation.

XXV.—1. In this middle place, then, the Syracusans and their allies were compelled, with a little more than thirty ships, to engage late in the day on behalf of a vessel sailing through, putting to sea against sixteen ships of the Athenians and eight Rhegian. 2. Being conquered by the Athenians, they sailed away in haste, as chance led each one, to their own camps, that at Messene and that at Rhegium, after losing one ship; and night fell upon the action. 3. After this the Locrians withdrew from the territory of the Rhegians, and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies, concentrating at Peloris in Messenia, lay at anchor with their land force close at hand. 4. The Athenians and Rhegians, sailing up and seeing the ships devoid of crews, made an attack, and themselves lost one ship, upon which a grappling-iron was thrown—the crew diving and swimming away. 5. After this, when the Syracusans had gone on board their ships and were being towed along to Messene, the Athenians, again attacking, lose another ship through their adversaries gaining the open by a side movement and being the first to attack.

6. Thus the Syracusans, having by no means the worse in the passage along the shore, and in the sea-fight which resulted as above described, made their way along to the harbour at Messene. 7. The Athenians, at the report that Camarina was on the point of being betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither, and the Messenians meanwhile made an expedition with all their land and sea forces against Naxos, the Chalcidian city on their borders. 8. On the first day, having forced the Naxians within their walls, they began ravaging the land, and the next day, sailing round with their ships to a point near the river Acesines, they continued their ravages, and with their land force they made an incursion towards the city. 9. Meanwhile the Sicels came down in numbers over the heights with aid against the Messenians. When the Naxians saw them they took heart and made encouraging speeches to one another, saying that the Leontines and other Greek allies were coming to their aid; then, making a sudden sally from the city, they fell upon the Messenians, and, putting them to flight, slew over a thousand, the remainder getting away homewards with difficulty, for the barbarians, falling upon them on the roads, cut off most of them. 10. The ships coming to land at Messene afterwards separated to their respective homes. 11. Straightway the Leontines and their allies, in conjunction with the Athenians, marched against Messene under the impression that it had been weakened, and on commencing the attack the Athenians made an attempt on the side of the harbour with their ships, and with the land-force against the city. 12. But the Messenians and some of the Locrians with Demoteles, who had been left in the city as a garrison after their disaster, suddenly falling upon them, routed the greater part of the Leontines' army and slew several men. The Athenians, seeing this, landed from their ships and came to the rescue: they chased the Messenians back to the city, coming upon them when they were in confusion, and, having erected a trophy, they retired to Rhegium. After this the Greeks in Sicily, apart from the Athenians, made expeditions by land against one another.

XXVI.—1. At Pylos the Athenians were still blockading

the Lacedæmonians on the island, and the Peloponnesian force on the mainland remained in position. 2. It was a troublesome task for the Athenians to keep watch owing to the want of food and water, for there was no spring except one quite on the acropolis of Pylos, and that not a plentiful one; so most of the men scooped away the shingle and drank such water as they were likely to find. 3. They suffered also from want of room, being encamped in a scanty space, and as the ships had no anchorage, some took their food on land in turns, while others remained afloat. 4. The greatest discouragement was caused by the prolongation of the time beyond their reckoning, for they thought they would force the men to surrender within a few days, as they were in a desert island and were using brackish water. 5. The cause of this was the issue of a proclamation by the Lacedæmonians, that anyone who chose should carry in ground corn and wine, and any other food of a kind fit for use in a blockade, rating it at a high price, and promising freedom to any of the Helots who carried it in. 6. It was carried in by others at all risks, but especially by the Helots, putting off from any point in Peloponnesus that offered them a chance, and coming to land, while it was still night, on the side of the island that faced the sea. 7. Most of all they watched for the chance of being borne to land by the wind; for it was easier to elude the look out of the triremes whenever there was a breeze from the sea, for it became difficult for the latter to lie at anchor all round, and for the others, the sailing to land came to be a reckless proceeding; for the vessels that they ran aground were paid for at a high price, and the hoplites were on the watch for them at the landing-places of the island. On the other hand, all that risked the attempt in calm weather were captured. 8. On the side of the harbour two divers used to swim in under the water, dragging, by a slender cord in skins, poppy-seed mixed with honey and crushed linseed. At first they escaped notice, but afterwards a watch was set upon them. Each side was contriving in every way, the one to send in provisions, the other to prevent their eluding them.

XXVII.—1. At Athens, on learning the news about the bad plight of the expedition and that food was reaching

the men on the island by water, people were at a loss, and feared that winter would overtake them and stop their blockade, seeing that the conveyance of supplies round Peloponnesus would be impossible—as well because their men were in a desert place, and because, even in summer, they were not in a position to send round a sufficient stock—and that there would be no blockading a country without harbours; but either on their slackening their watch the men would get over their difficulties, or would look out for stormy weather and sail away in the vessels that brought them food. 2. Most of all, they were alarmed at the action of the Lacedæmonians, because they thought they must have some strong ground for confidence, as they no longer made overtures to them; and they repented of not having accepted the offer of peace. 3. Cleon, perceiving the suspicion they entertained towards himself with regard to the hindrance of the agreement, said that those who brought the news did not tell the truth. A suggestion having been made by those who had come, that if they did not believe them they should send commissioners of inspection, he himself was chosen commissioner by the Athenians along with Theogenes. Perceiving now that he would be obliged either to give the same account as those whom he slandered, or if he said the contrary to be shown up in the future as a liar, and seeing that the Athenians were somewhat more eager in mind to make an expedition, he suggested that the proper thing was not to send commissioners, nor to procrastinate and let the opportunity slip, but if they thought the report was true to sail against the men. 5. He also indicated, with sidelong reference to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was a general at the time (being his enemy, and wishing to taunt him), that it was easy with a proper force, if the generals were men, to sail and capture those in the island, and that he himself would do it, if he were in command.

XXVIII.—1. Nicias, when the Athenians raised some clamour at Cleon because he did not even now sail since it appeared easy to him, and at the same time seeing him utter taunts, desired him, as far as they were concerned, to take whatever force he liked and make the attempt. 2. At

first Cleon was ready, thinking that Nicias was giving up only in pretence; but when he perceived that he really wished to hand over the command, he was for drawing back, and said it was not he that was general, but the other. He was now alarmed, and thought that Nicias would not bring himself to make way for him. Nicias, however, repeated his challenge, and withdrew from the command against Pylos, making the Athenians his witnesses. 3. And, as a mob is wont to do, the more Cleon tried to get off the expedition and backed out of what he had said, the more they urged Nicias to give up the command, and called loudly on the other to sail. 4. In the end, finding no loophole any longer to get clear of what he had said, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians, and that he would take no one out of the city with him on the voyage, but only some Lemnians and Imbrians that were there, and some peltasts, who had come as a reinforcement from Ænos, and four hundred archers from other places. Further, he said that with this force, in addition to the soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the Lacedæmonians alive or kill them on the spot. 5. Some slight fit of laughter fell upon the Athenians at his flippant talk. Nevertheless, it proved a satisfaction to sensible men, reckoning that they would gain one of two objects: either to be quit of Cleon for the future, which they rather expected, or, if they erred in their judgment, he would subdue the Lacedæmonians for them.

XXIX.—1. Having got everything settled in the assembly, and the Athenians having assigned the expedition to him by decree, he chose one of the generals at Pylos, Demosthenes, to act with him, and prepared to start with all speed. 2. He associated Demosthenes with him because he heard that he was meditating a landing on the island. 3. For the soldiers, being dispirited at the difficulties of the place, and being in the position of besieged men rather than besiegers, were eager to risk a bold stroke; moreover, he gathered confidence from the firing of the island. For previously, as it was covered with wood for the most part, and had no paths from being always uninhabited, he was afraid, and thought this to be rather in the enemies' favour;

for if a large army landed they might fall upon it from an unseen spot and do much harm. Their opponents' blunderings and preparation would, in consequence of the forest, not be in the same degree plain to them; but all the mistakes of their own force would be quite manifest, so that the enemy might fall upon them unexpectedly whenever they chose, for the initiative would always be theirs. 5. If, on the other hand, he should force his way into a thicket to close quarters, he considered that an inferior force well acquainted with the ground was superior to a larger force without that acquaintance, and that their own force, great as it was, would be cut off imperceptibly through not being able to see where they ought to come to one another's aid.

XXX.—1. These considerations occurred to him with great force in consequence of his disaster in Ætolia, which happened in some degree owing to the forest. 2. The soldiers being compelled on account of their want of room to land on the edge of the island and get their dinner with a guard in front, and someone having unintentionally set fire to a small portion of the forest, and a wind having afterwards arisen, the greater part of it was burned down without their being aware of it. 3. Thus, then, seeing more plainly that the Lacedæmonians were more numerous—previously he suspected that they were sending in corn for a smaller number there than they had stated—and that the island was easier to land upon, and that the Athenians were showing more zeal as for an object worth their trouble, he began to prepare for the attempt, sending for forces from the allies near at hand, and getting everything else ready. 4. Cleon, having sent forward a messenger to say that he should soon be there, arrived at Pylos with the force he asked for. Having had a meeting, they first sent a herald to the encampment on the mainland, inviting them if they chose without danger to themselves to order the men on the island to give up to them their arms and their persons, on which condition they should be kept under mild custody until some understanding was come to on the main point at issue.

XXXI.—1. On their declining, they held off for one day; but on the next they set out by night, embarking all

the hoplites on a few vessels, and a little before dawn they proceeded to land on either side of the island, both from the open sea and on the side of the harbour, about 800 hoplites in all, and they advanced at a run against the first post on the island; (2) for they had been arranged as follows—in the first post there were about thirty hoplites, but the central and most level part near about the spring was held by Epitadas, the commander, with the bulk of the troops; while some part, not a large one, guarded the very extremity of the island towards Pylos, which rose precipitously from the sea, and was very little assailable from the land. For there also stood an ancient fort of some size, made of stones laid as they were gathered, which they thought might be useful to them if a retreat under very hard pressure should befall them; thus, then, they were arranged.

XXXII.—1. The Athenians put to the sword at once the first pickets, upon whom they rushed, for they were still on their beds or just taking up their arms, the landing having been unobserved by them, as they thought that the ships, according to custom, were sailing to their stations for the night. 2. As soon as morning dawned the rest of the force also landed—the entire crews from somewhat more than seventy ships, except the rowers on the lowest benches, equipped as each might be; also 800 archers, and a no less number of peltasts; those also of the Messenians who had come as a reinforcement, and all others who were in occupation about Pylos, except the guards upon the fort. 3. By Demosthenes' disposition they were distributed into bodies of 200 or more, and at some points fewer, seizing the highest grounds, that the enemy might be in very great embarrassment from being encircled on all sides, and might not know which way to show a front, but might become exposed to a double attack from the multitude of their foes; if they charged those in front, being assailed by those in the rear, and if against those on the flanks, by the men ranged on either side. 4. Again, whichever way they advanced, they were likely to have the enemy at their backs—the light-armed and those who gave the most trouble with bows, javelins, stones and slings—full of fight at a distance, against whom it was not possible

even to march ; for they had the advantage in running away, and pressed hard upon their retreat. With such a design as this Demosthenes at the first planned the landing and arranged it in action.

XXXIII.—1. Epitadas and his troops, who formed the largest part of those in the island, when they saw that the first post was put to the sword, and that the army was advancing against them, formed in order of battle, and advanced against the hoplites of the Athenians, wishing to come to close quarters ; for it was these that were ranged against them, while the light-armed were on the flank and rear. 2. They were not able, then, to engage with the hoplites, nor to make their own skill available : for the light troops checked them by assailing them on both sides, and at the same time the others did not advance against them, but kept still. The light troops they routed, wherever they exposed themselves, by a charge ; and they, turning back, would defend themselves, being men lightly equipped and easily getting a start in flight in consequence of the difficulty of the ground, and its ruggedness from being previously uninhabited, on which the Lacedæmonians with their heavy arms were unable to give chase.

XXXIV.—1. For some short time, then, they skirmished thus with one another. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able to make a sharp rush upon the light troops where they attacked them, the latter perceived that they were already somewhat slack in defending themselves, and they themselves had gathered most confidence from their seeing that they appeared many times more numerous than their foes ; still more because they had not at once met with a handling as bad as their expectations—they had become accustomed no longer to consider them as terrible as they did when they first landed, cowed in their minds at the thought of going against Lacedæmonians ; thus getting to scorn them, and raising a shout, all together they rushed upon them, and assailed them with stones, arrows and darts, as each one found anything ready to his hand. 2. As the shout arose simultaneously with the charge, dismay fell upon men unaccustomed to this kind of fighting, and the dust from the wood lately burnt was going upwards

in a cloud, and it was impossible to see what was before one because of the arrows and stones hurled by many hands and coming along with the dust. 3. At this point the action took a distressing turn for the Lacedæmonians; for their felts were not proof against the arrows, and darts were broken off in them as they were hit, and they did not know what to do with themselves, being shut off as to sight from a view in front. Again, in consequence of the louder shouts of the enemy, they did not catch orders passing along their own line, and, with danger surrounding them on all side, they had no hope as to how they ought to defend and save themselves.

XXXV.—1. At length, when many were already being wounded through always moving to and fro on the same ground, they closed up and marched to the fort at the end of the island, which was at no great distance, and to their own guards. When they gave way, then, at once the light troops, with a much louder shout, gathered courage and pressed hard upon them. All the Lacedæmonians who were caught in their retreat perished; but the greater part made good their escape to the fort and ranged themselves all along it there with the guards, with the intention of keeping up a defence where it was assailable. 3. The Athenians, following them closely, had no opportunity of getting round and encircling them from the strength of the position; but they advanced in front, and tried to force a passage. 4. For some time, and indeed the greater part of the day, both sides held out, though distressed in consequence of the fighting and thirst and heat of the sun, the one striving to drive their foes from the high ground, the others not to give in; the Lacedæmonians defending themselves more easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on the flanks.

XXXVI.—1. As it was still undecided, the general of the Messenians, going up to Cleon and Demosthenes, said they were toiling in vain; but that if they chose to give him a portion of the archers and light troops to go round behind them by a way that he would himself find, he thought he should force the approach. 2. Getting what he asked for, he started from a spot out of sight, so as not to be observed

by them, and approaching along the precipitous part of the island as the ground permitted, and, at a point where the Lacedæmonians, trusting to the strength of the place, were not on the look-out, he got round with trouble and difficulty, yet without being noticed, and appearing suddenly on the height behind their backs, he astounded them by the unexpected occurrence, but caused a much greater increase of confidence to his friends on seeing what they were looking for. 3. The Lacedæmonians, being now assailed on both sides, and finding themselves in the same conjuncture, to compare small with great, as at Thermopylæ—for those men were cut off by the detour of the Persians along the path, and these, being now attacked on both sides, no longer held out; but as they were few fighting with a number, and from weakness of body for want of food, they gave up the contest, and the Athenians were at length masters of the approaches.

XXXVII.—1. Cleon and Demosthenes, perceiving that if they should give in ever so little further they would be destroyed by their own force, stopped the battle and kept off their own men, wishing to take them to Athens alive, to try if on hearing the herald's summons they would be broken down in their determination so as to give up their arms and would submit to their present calamity. 2. So they made proclamation that if they wished they should surrender their arms and their persons to the Athenians on the understanding that those yonder should decide as they thought best.

XXXVIII.—1. On hearing it they lowered their shields, that is, the greater part of them, and waved their hands, showing that they assented to the terms of the proclamation. After this, a suspension of arms taking place, a conference was entered into by Cleon and Demosthenes, and from the other side by Styphon, the son of Pharax, for of the former commanders the first Epitadas was dead, and the one who had been chosen to succeed him, Hippagretus, was lying among the corpses still living, but as good as dead, and he had been chosen with the other two, according to custom, to take the command if anything happened to them. 2. Styphon and his party said that they wished to

send a message to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland, to know what they ought to do. 3. The Athenians did not allow any of them to go ; but themselves summoned heralds from the mainland, and after inquiries had passed twice or thrice, the last man who crossed brought a message from the Lacedæmonians on the mainland to the effect that 'The Lacedæmonians desire you to decide on your own course, provided you do nothing disgraceful.' So they, deliberating by themselves, gave up their arms and their persons. 4. For that day and the following night the Athenians kept them under guard ; but on the day after the Athenians set up a trophy on the island, and among other arrangements for sailing they distributed the men to the trierarchs to be guarded, and the Lacedæmonians sending a herald, got the dead conveyed over to them. 5. Now, the number of those who fell in the island and were captured alive was as follows : there crossed in all four hundred and twenty hoplites ; of these, three hundred, all but eight, were taken away alive ; the rest were killed ; and of these who were alive about a hundred and twenty were Spartans. Not many of the Athenians fell, for it was not a hand-to-hand fight.

XXXIX.—1. The whole time during which the men in the island were blockaded from the sea-fight till the battle on the island amounted to seventy-two days. For about twenty of these during which the ambassadors were away about the treaty, they were supplied with food ; but for the remainder they were fed throughout by those who sailed in secretly. 2. There was also corn on the island, and other food was found there, for the commander Epitadas used to give it out to each man in a shorter quantity than he might have done. The Athenians then, and the Peloponnesians, withdrew with their forces from Pylos to their respective homes, and Cleon's promise, though a mad one, was fulfilled, for within twenty days he brought these men as he engaged to.

XL.—1. This incident, more than any other during the war, turned out contrary to the expectation of the Greeks, for their estimate of the Lacedæmonians was that they gave up their arms neither for hunger nor any straits, but kept

them and fought, as they were able, to the death. 2. In fact, scarcely believing that those who surrendered were men of the same standard as those who fell, and on one of the Athenian allies some time afterwards inquiring of one of the captives from the island, by way of teasing him, whether those of them who fell were brave gentlemen, he gave him for answer that the spindle, meaning the arrow, would be worth a great deal if it distinguished the brave men—giving a clear indication that anyone who came in the way of the stones and arrows was killed.

XLI.—1. When the men were brought, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison till they should come to some agreement, and if before that the Peloponnesians invaded the country, to take them out and put them to death. 2. They had a garrison established at Pylos, and the Messenians from Naupactus, sending the fittest among them thither as into their native country—for Pylos belongs to the country which was once Messenian—made plundering incursions into Laconia, and did much harm, speaking, as they did, the same dialect. 3. The Lacedæmonians, as in former times they had taken no harm from a predatory war of this kind, and as their Helots were deserting, being alarmed lest they should have more extensive revolutions in the institutions of their country, were uneasy; but though they did not wish their feelings to be made manifest to the Athenians, they kept sending embassies to them and tried to gain possession of Pylos and their men. 4. They, on the other hand, aimed at greater advantages, and though they often came, they sent them back without having gained their end. This, then, is what happened with regard to Pylos.

XLII.—1. The same summer, immediately after this, the Athenians made an expedition against the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand hoplites of their own, and two hundred horsemen in horse transports; they were accompanied by some from the allies—Milesians and Andrians and Carystians. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, was the general, with two others. 2. Proceeding on their voyage, they came to land at dawn between the peninsula and Rheitus, on the beach near the spot above which is the

Solygian hill, on which the Dorians formerly established themselves in their war with the Corinthians in the city, who were Æolians, and there is now a village on it called Solygia. 3. This village is twelve stadia distant from this beach where the ships came to land, and the city of the Corinthians is sixty stadia distant, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having intelligence beforehand from Argos that the army of the Athenians would come, had some time before come to the rescue as far as the isthmus, all except those beyond the isthmus; there were more, over five hundred of them, absent in the garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; the rest were watching in full force where the Athenians would make the land. When they escaped their notice by sailing to land at night, and the fire-signals were raised for their information, leaving half their own body at Cenchrea, in case the Athenians should come against Crommyon, they marched to the rescue with all speed.

XLIII.—1. Battus, one of the generals—for there were two who were present at the engagement—took a *lochus* and marched to the village Solygia to protect it, as it was unfortified, and Lycophron proceeded to engage with the rest. First, the Corinthians came to blows with the right wing of the Athenians just as it had landed in front of the peninsula, and afterwards with the rest of the army. The fight was a desperate one, and hand to hand throughout. The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians, for these had been drawn up along the extremity of the line, received the charge of the Corinthians, and drove them back with difficulty; but they, retreating to a stone wall—the ground, by the way, was all uphill—pelted them with the stones from their higher position, and, singing the pæan, came on again; on the Athenians receiving their charge the battle was again hand to hand. 3. A *lochus* of the Corinthians, coming as a reinforcement to their own left wing, routed the Athenians' right wing and chased them to the sea; but again the Athenians and Carystians wheeled round from the ships, and the rest of the army was fighting continuously on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, on which Lycophron, being opposed to the left wing of the Athenians, was acting on the defensive, for they expected

that they would make an attempt towards the village of Solygia.

XLIV.—1. For a long time then they held out without giving way to one another; but afterwards, as the Athenians had effective help in the battle from their horsemen, while the other side had no horses, the Corinthians turned, and, retiring to the hill, they grounded arms and no longer attempted to come down, but remained quiet. 2. It was in this rout on the right wing that they lost most men—among them Lycophron, their general. The rest of the army, in the way above described, not hard pressed, nor having made a hasty flight when it was overpowered, retired to the high ground and established itself firmly. 3. Finding the enemy no longer advanced to battle with them, the Athenians stripped the dead on the enemy's side, took up their own, and immediately set up a trophy. As to the half of the Corinthian force which was stationed at Cenchrea to watch that they did not sail against Crommyon, the battle was not plainly visible to them because of the mountain Oneium; but seeing the dust and knowing what it meant, they at once came to the rescue. 4. The same thing was done by the elder men of the Corinthians from the city when they perceived what had taken place. The Athenians, seeing them come against them in a body, and thinking that it was a relieving force of the Peloponnesians from the neighbourhood that was marching against them, retired in haste to their ships with the spoils and their own dead, except two that they left on the field because they could not find them. 5. Going on board their ships, they crossed to the islands hard by, and thence sending a herald, they took up under truce the dead whom they had left on the field. There fell in the battle, of the Corinthians two hundred and twelve; of the Athenians something less than fifty.

XLV.—1. Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon, in the Corinthian territory, distant from the city a hundred and twenty stadia. Coming to anchor, they laid waste the land and bivouacked for the night. 2. The following day they sailed along to the Epidaurian territory, and after making some sort of

landing, they arrived at Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and Trœzen; there they cut off by a fortification the isthmus connected with the peninsula, on which Methone stands, and establishing a fortified post, they plundered for some time after the territory of Trœzen, Halias, and Epidaurus. When they had fortified the place they sailed away homewards with their ships.

XLVI.—1. About the same time that this was happening, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after putting out from Pylos for Sicily with the ships of the Athenians, arrived at Coreyra; there they joined the city faction in an expedition against those of the Coreyræans, who had established themselves on the mountain of Istone, and who, crossing after the insurrection, had at that time possession of the land, and were doing much harm. 2. Making their attack, they took the fort, and the men, having taken refuge on some higher ground, agreed to surrender their auxiliaries and await the decision of the Athenian people respecting themselves, after giving up their arms. The generals conveyed them under truce to the island Ptychia, to be kept under guard till they could be sent to Athens, on the understanding that if anyone was caught stealing away the truce should be at an end for all. 3. But the leaders of the popular party in Coreyra, fearing that the Athenians would not put to death those who were sent, contrive a scheme like this: they work upon some few of the men on the island by secretly sending friends to them, and instructing them to say, as if with kindly purpose, that it was the best thing for them to steal away as quickly as possible, and that they would have a vessel ready, for the generals of the Athenians intended to give them up to the popular party of the Coreyræans.

XLVII.—1. When they had prevailed upon them, and when, by their managing the movements of the vessel, the men were caught sailing out, the truce, you see, at once came to an end, and they were given up to the Coreyræans one and all. A circumstance that contributed in no small degree to a result like this—so that the pretext became plausible, and its contrivers took it in hand with less hesitation—was that the generals of the Athenians made it plain

that they would not like the conveyance of the men by others (since they themselves were sailing for Sicily), to attach the honour to those who took them. 2. The Corcyræans, having got them into their hands, shut them up in a large apartment, and afterwards, taking them out twenty at a time, they led them between two rows of hoplites drawn up on each side, bound to each other, and all the while being smitten and stabbed by the men ranged along the line, whenever anyone saw a personal enemy, men with whips going by the side and quickening on the way those who came on two slowly.

XLVIII.—1. They took out as many as sixty men and destroyed them in this way, unperceived by those in the chamber, for they thought they were taking them to remove them somewhere else ; but when they perceived it, or someone made it known to them, they called to the Athenians and desired them to despatch them themselves, if they chose, but refused any longer to go out of the chamber, and said that as far as they could they would not allow anyone to come in without resistance. 2. The Corcyræans, on their part, had no idea of forcing their way by the doors, but went upon the roof of the chamber and, tearing open the roofing, they pelted them with tiles or shot arrows down below. 3. The prisoners sheltered themselves as they were best able, and at the same time most of them put an end to their own lives by thrusting into their throats the arrows that their enemies discharged, and by hanging themselves with the ropes from some beds which happened to be in the place, and with strips made from their garments, and in every possible way through the greater part of the night (for night closed over the horrible scene) making away with themselves, or being despatched with arrows and stones by those above. 4. As soon as day broke, the Corcyræans, laying them in cross-layers on waggons, took them outside the city ; all the women that were taken in the fort they reduced to slavery. In such fashion the Corcyræans in the mountain were cut off by the popular party, and the internal struggle, after raging violently, came to this termination, at least, as concerns this war, for of the one party there was nothing left worth mention. The Athenians sailed

away to Sicily, which had been their destination at first, and carried on the war in conjunction with their allies there.

XLIX.—The Athenians at Naupactus, along with the Acarnanians, towards the close of the summer marched against Anaetorium, a city of the Corinthians, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, and got possession of it by treachery; and having sent away the Corinthians, Acarnanian settlers from all parts had the place to themselves. Thus the summer came to an end.

L.—1. In the following winter Aristides, the son of Archipus, one of the generals of the ships which were sent to levy contributions from the allies, arrested at Eion, on the Strymon, Artaphernes, a Persian, as he was proceeding from the king's court to Lacedæmon. 2. When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians had the letter transcribed from the Assyrian characters, and read it; among many other things written in it, the substance was an intimation to the Lacedæmonians that he did not understand what they wanted; for though many ambassadors came, none of them agreed in their messages. 3. If, therefore, they wished to speak plainly, they should send some men with the Persian to the king himself. Artaphernes was afterwards sent away by the Athenians, in a trireme, to Ephesus, and some ambassadors along with him; but learning there that Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes was lately dead (for he died about this time), they went back home.

LI.—The same winter, also, the Chians took down the new wall round their city at the bidding of the Athenians, who suspected that they would make some revolutionary movement against themselves, obtaining, however, pledges and security on the Athenians' part to the utmost of their power that the latter would take no new step with regard to them. So ended the winter and the seventh year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

LII.—1. At the very commencement of the next summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun about new moon, and at the beginning of the same month there was an earthquake. The exiles from the Mytilenæans and the other Lesbians, setting out—that is, most of them—from the main-

land with an auxiliary force, which they had hired from Peloponnesus and collected on the spot, took Rhœteum; but on receiving two thousand Phocæan staters they restored it without having done any injury. 2. After this they marched upon Antandros, and gained possession of the city through an act of treachery. Their intention was to free the other cities called Actæan, which the Athenians held though formerly Mytilenæans inhabited them, and above all things Antandros. 3. After making themselves masters of it—with ships which there were ample means of building, as timber was abundant and Ida lay close by, and with other warlike material—they thought they might easily make it their head-quarters to injure Lesbos, which was near, and subdue the Æolian towns on the mainland. These, then, were the objects for which they intended to make preparations.

LIII.—1. The Athenians in the course of the same summer made an expedition against Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a few horsemen, taking with them from among their allies some Milesians and others; their generals were Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles the son of Tolmæus. 2. Cythera is an island lying close to Laconia, opposite Malea; the inhabitants are Lacedæmonians of the class of the Periceci, and an official named the Justice of Cythera went over thither from Sparta year by year, and they used to send from time to time a garrison of hoplites, and paid much attention to it. 3. For it was their landing-place for merchantmen from Egypt and Libya; pirates, too, were less in the habit of harassing Laconia from the sea, at the only point on which it is open to be damaged, for it all juts out towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

LIV.—1. The Athenians then, having made the land with their armament, capture the city on the coast called Scandea, with ten ships and two thousand hoplites of the Milesians, and landing with the rest of their forces on the part of the island which faces Malea, they advanced against the city of the Cytherians which is by the sea, and at once found them all encamped there. 2. A battle taking place, the Cytherians stood their ground for some little time, but afterwards,

turning about, they took refuge in the upper city and subsequently agreed with Nicias and his fellow-commanders to submit to the Athenians' decision respecting them, only stipulating that their lives should be spared. There were also proposals made before by Nicias to some of the Cytherians; (3) on which account the present agreement and that which followed was made more speedily by them and on more favourable terms; for otherwise the Athenians would have ejected the Cytherians, because they were Lacedæmonians and the island lay close to the Laconian territory. 4. After the capitulation the Athenians took into their hands Scandea, the town upon the harbour, and arranged for a garrison in Cythera. They then sailed to Asine and Helos and most of the coast towns; there making landings and bivouacking at any opportune spots, they ravaged the country for about seven days.

LV.—1. The Lacedæmonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting that they would make descents of this kind, nowhere concentrated their forces against them, but sent garrisons to different places about the country; namely, such force of hoplites as each place required. In other matters they exercised great watchfulness, fearing lest they should have to meet any revolutionary movement with regard to the established order of things, since the disaster which they had met with on the island was most unexpected and severe, and Pylos and Cythera were occupied by the enemy. They were, moreover, beset on all sides by a warfare swift and impossible to guard against, so that, contrary to their custom, they raised a force of four hundred horsemen and archers; with regard to the war, they became, if ever, more than usually disinclined for it, being engaged contrary to the fundamental type of their military armament in a naval contest, and that with Athenians, who looked upon what they did not undertake as so much lost of what they thought to accomplish. 2. At the same time the blows of fortune, contrary to their reckoning, coming frequently and in a short space of time, caused them very great dismay, and they feared lest some disaster, like that on the island, should again befall them at some time or other. 3. On this account they were less coura-

geous in battle, and thought that they would go wrong in everything they set on foot, owing to their having lost reliance upon their judgment, from not being previously accustomed to want of success.

LVI.—1. The Athenians engaged at the time in ravaging the maritime country found them for the most part keeping quiet, when any landing was made near a particular garrison, thinking themselves in each case too few in number, especially considering the existing state of things. 2. One garrison, which did repel an attack about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, frightened by a rush the mob of light-armed troops scattered about; but when the hoplites met them, they withdrew again, some few of them falling and their arms being taken, and the Athenians after erecting a trophy sailed away to Cythera. 3. Thence they sailed round to Epidaurus Limeræ, and after ravaging some part of the land they arrived at Thyrea, which forms part of the territory called Cynuria, and is a border-land between the Argive and Laconian territory. 4. Being in possession of it, the Lacedæmonians gave it to some Æginetans to dwell in when expelled from their own country, on account of the great kindnesses done to them at the time of the earthquake and the Helots' revolt, and because, though subject to the Athenians, they always sided in opinion with their adversaries.

LVII.—1. While the Athenians were yet sailing against them, the Æginetans abandoned the fort on the coast which they happened to be building, and withdrew to the upper city, in which they dwelt, distant about ten stadia from the sea. 2. One detachment of the Lacedæmonians who were up and down the country, which was helping them to build the fort, was unwilling to go with them into the fortress when the Æginetans begged them—now it appeared to them dangerous to be shut up in it—but retiring to the highlands, as they did not think they were strong enough for a battle, they kept quiet. 3. Meanwhile the Athenians came to land, and, advancing at once with their whole force, they took Thyrea. They burned the city, and plundered what was in it. They reached Athens, taking with them all the Æginetans that had not been killed in the fight, and the commander of the Lacedæmonians, who was with them,

Tantalus the son of Patrocles ; for he was taken alive after having been wounded. 4. They brought also some few men from Cythera, whom they thought it well to transport for the sake of security. These the Athenians determined to locate for safety in the islands, and that the other Cytherians should dwell in their own country and pay as their tribute four talents, but to put to death all the Æginetans that were taken prisoners, because of their former constant hostility, and to put Tantalus into prison along with the other Lacedæmonians that were on the island.

LVIII.—The same summer in Sicily a suspension of arms was made by the people of Camarina and Gela, at first with one another ; afterwards, the other Siceliots assembling at Gela, deputies from all the cities came to conference with one another, to try if they could settle their differences. Many other opinions were expressed both ways, the speakers raising discussions and making claims, according as each one thought that he was at some disadvantage ; and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, who had very great influence with them, made a speech as follows for the general interest :

LIX.—1. 'It is not as the representative of a very small city, Siceliots, that I shall address you, nor of one which suffers greatly in the war, but endeavouring to set forth for the common interest what seems to me the best plan for all Sicily to decide upon. 2. As regards the hardships of war, why should anyone make a long speech, picking out all that it contains, among people who are well aware of it ? For no one is either driven by ignorance to engage in it, nor turned aside by fear, if he thinks he will gain any advantage ; and it turns out that the gains appear to some greater than the dangers, while others are willing to submit to the risks rather than suffer any immediate loss. 3. Now, if both sides should happen to be acting just so at the wrong time, exhortations to a reconciliation would be useful ; and if we were convinced of it at the present time, it would prove to be of the highest importance ; for it was with the design, one would think, of making our own position good, that we went to war at first, and now we

are trying by means of disputes to become reconciled with one another, and if each one should not succeed in getting a fair settlement before he goes away, we shall go to war again.

LX.—1. ‘And yet we ought to make up our minds, if we are prudent, that the conference should be not for our individual interests, but whether, when all Sicily is, as I judge, the object of the Athenians’ designs, we shall yet be able to preserve it. We ought also to think that in these matters the Athenians present far more cogent grounds for reconciliation than my words do, for they, having greater power than any of the Greeks, are watching for our errors, being here with a few ships, and, under the legitimate name of alliance, are speciously turning what is naturally hostile to their own advantage. 2. For if we get up a war and call them in—men who send an armed force even to those who do not call upon them—and do ourselves harm at our own cost, at the same time that we are clearing the way for their dominion, it is likely that when they see we are worn out they will come some time with a larger armament and try to put all that you see under their own power.

LXI.—1. ‘Yet, if we are prudent, it is to gain additions, each to his own state, from what does not belong to it, rather than to damage what it already has, that we should call in allies and take upon ourselves the necessary dangers. We ought also to think that dissension is the chief curse of the cities and of Sicily, for though we, its inhabitants, are being plotted against as a whole, yet as individual cities we are at variance. 2. Perceiving this, we ought to be reconciled individual with individual, and city with city, and make a general effort to save Sicily; the thought should not occur to anyone that the Dorians among us are hostile to the Athenians, while the Chalcidian race is secure, owing to its kindred with the Ionians. 3. For they are not coming among us because Sicily naturally falls into two parts as to its component nations, and from hatred of the one of these, but from a desire for the good things in Sicily which we possess in common. They made this plain just now on the occasion of the appeal from the Chalcidian race; for of their own accord they eagerly rendered what was required

in excess of their agreement to men who had never brought aid to them according to the terms of their alliance. 4. I look with indulgence upon the Athenians entertaining these ambitious views and forecasting in this way, and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are over-ready to obey; for it is the nature of man always to rule those that yield, but to be on one's guard against those who make an attack. All of us are in error who, perceiving this, do not rightly look ahead, and so is anyone who has not come with the conviction that it is of the highest importance to dispose as one man of the common terror. 5. The speediest settlement of it would be made if we were to come to an understanding with one another; for the Athenians have not their own country as a base of operations, but the country of those who have invited them. Thus war is not put an end to by war, but differences by peace without any trouble, and those who have been invited, coming with a specious appearance on an unjust errand, will with good reason be dismissed without effecting their purpose.

LXII.—1. 'As regards the Athenians, so great is our advantage found to be, if we take good counsel; and when peace is admitted by all to be a most excellent thing, ought we not also to conclude it among ourselves? Or think you, supposing that someone has some good thing, or someone else the contrary, is it not quiet rather than war that will benefit either party by putting a stop to the one and securing the other, and peace that has honours and splendours less exposed to risk, and all other subjects that anyone might run over in lengthy speech just as if he were talking about war? 2. Having regard to these things, it behoves you not to slight my words, but, each one dwelling upon them, to look beforehand to his own safety. Moreover, if anyone thinks that he will make some sure gain, either from the justice of his cause or by violence, let him not take it ill if he fails in a way contrary to his expectations, knowing that many before now, whether pursuing ill-doers with vengeance, or in other cases hoping to gain an advantage by some power or other—the one have not only not avenged themselves, but have not even secured their own safety; and to the others the result has been that, instead

of having more, they left behind something of their own besides. 3. For vengeance is not successful according to the requirements of justice because wrong is done, nor is strength reliable because it is hopeful ; but the incalculable element in the future for the most part prevails, and though the most deceptive of all things, yet it proves itself most useful—for, having equal ground for fear, we go against one another with a greater exercise of forethought.

LXIII.—1. 'Now, both because of the inscrutable fear inspired by this obscurity, and because of the alarm already caused by the presence of the Athenians, being dismayed by both alike, and thinking that our shortcoming from the estimated success, which each one of us thought to accomplish, has been sufficiently accounted for by the hindrance arising from these obstacles, let us dismiss from our country the enemies that imminently threaten us, and ourselves come to an agreement for ever as our best course ; (2) otherwise, at any rate, let us make a truce for as long a time as possible, and put off our private differences to a future opportunity. In a word, let us determine, according to my suggestion, that we will each keep our city free, from which we shall start, with independent power, to requite equally, like good and true men, both those that do us good and those that do us harm. 3. But if through non-compliance we submit to others, the question will not be of punishing anyone, but even if we were ever so successful we should necessarily become friendly with our deadly foes, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to quarrel.

LXIV.—1. 'I, as I said at the beginning, representing a very powerful city, and more likely to be an assailant than to have to defend myself, think it right, with these considerations in view, to make concessions, and not so to injure my adversaries as to be exposed to greater harm myself, nor in a foolish spirit of rivalry to think that I am just as much lord of my own designs as of a fortune which I do not command, but to give way as far as is proper. 2. I think it right, too, that the rest of you should do the same as I of your own motion, and not be driven to it by your enemies. There is no disgrace in kinsmen giving way to kinsmen, either a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to men of the

same race, as we are, in one general view, neighbours and joint dwellers in one country, and that surrounded by the sea, and called by one name—Siceliots; for we shall go to war, I fancy, when the chance befalls us, and shall come to terms again, conferring in common by ourselves. 3. But foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, repel in a body, seeing that when severally injured we are all in danger, and shall not for the future ever bring in either allies or mediators; for by so doing we shall at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings, namely to be rid both of the Athenians and of domestic war, and for the future we shall dwell by ourselves in a free country, and one that is in a less degree the object of others' evil designs.'

LXV.—1. When Hermocrates had spoken to this purport, the Siceliots, hearkening to him, came to terms among themselves by a formal resolution that they should desist from the war, each state keeping what it had, and that the Camarinæans should have Morgantine on paying the Syracusans a fixed sum of money; (2) and the allies of the Athenians, summoning their commanders, told them that they should join in the agreement, and that they, too, should be parties to the treaty: on their giving their approval they entered into the agreement, and the ships of the Athenians sailed away after this from Sicily. 3. When the generals arrived, the Athenians in the city punished two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, by banishment; from the third, Eurymedon, they exacted a fine, alleging that when they had an opportunity of subduing the Sicilian communities they had been prevailed upon by bribes to retire. 4. Thus in the enjoyment of their present good fortune they expected nothing to prove an obstacle to them, but that they should accomplish just as well with a deficient as with a great armament alike what was possible and what was more difficult: the cause which inspired them with these strong hopes was their unaccountable success in most of their enterprises.

LXVI.—1. The same summer the Megareans who were in the city, being hard pressed by the Athenians in open war, (for twice every year they marched in full force into the country), and by their own exiles in Pegæ, who, being

expelled by the popular party, when the city was disturbed by faction, were giving trouble by plundering excursions, began to confer with one another as to the propriety of receiving back the exiles and avoiding a double mischief to the city. 2. When the friends of those outside perceived the general talk to be carried on more openly than before, they also thought fit to insist on this proposal. The leaders of the popular party, perceiving that the people would not be able, in consequence of their hardships, to hold out on their side, make proposals, through fear, to the generals of the Athenians, Hippocrates the son of Aripbron, and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, wishing to give up the city, and thinking that this was a less danger than the return of those who had been expelled by themselves. 3. They came to an understanding that the Athenians should first seize the long walls—it was about eight stadia from the city to their harbour Nisæa—that the Peloponnesians might not come to their aid from Nisæa, in which they kept guard by themselves for the sake of making sure of Megara; and that afterwards they should try to give up the upper city. They thought the Megareans were likely to surrender more easily when this had been effected.

LXVII.—1. The Athenians then, when preparations had been made by both parties, both in action and in word, sailed towards nightfall to Minoa, the Megareans' island, with six hundred hoplites, under the command of Hippocrates, and encamped in a claypit, from which they used to get bricks for their walls, and which was not far off. 2. The troops, with Demosthenes, the other general, light-armed Plateans and some of the frontier guard besides, went into ambuscade at the temple of Euyalios, which is at a shorter distance away, and no one perceived it except the men whose business it was to know all about this night. When it was on the point of dawn, the would-be traitors of the Megareans, for their part, did as follows:—under colour of piracy, they had long before provided for the opening of the gates, and were accustomed, with the governor's assent, to convey a sculling-boat upon a waggon through the trench to the sea and sail away; (4) then, before it was day, they used to carry it back on the waggon and

bring it through the gates within the walls, that the Athenians at Minoa might be, as they pretended, uncertain what to look out for, as no vessel was visible in the harbour. 5. On this occasion the waggon was ready at the gates, and when they were opened according to custom as if for the boat—for the business was managed thus by signal—the Athenians saw it, and ran at full speed from their ambush, wishing to come up before the gates were shut again, and while the waggon was still passing in, as that was a hindrance to closing them. At the same time the Megareans who were acting with them killed the guards at the gates. 6. At first, Demosthenes' party, consisting of Plateans and frontier guards, rushed in where now the trophy is, and immediately beginning to fight within the gates (for the nearest Peloponnesians perceived what was going on), the Plateans overpowered those who came to the rescue, and made sure of the gates for the Athenian hoplites as they advanced.

LXVIII.—1. Afterwards, each one of the Athenians as he got in made for the wall. The Peloponnesian garrison, at first making a stand, resisted in small numbers, and some of them fell; but the greater part betook themselves to flight, being alarmed both because the enemy had fallen upon them by night, and thinking, since Megarean traitors took part in the fight against them, that all the Megareans had betrayed them. 2. For it happened along with this that the herald of the Athenians, acting on his own judgment, proclaimed that any one of the Megareans who liked should go and fall in with the Athenians. When they heard this they were for staying no longer, but really thinking that a general attack was being made upon them, they fled for refuge to Nisæa. 3. At dawn, when the walls were already captured and the Megareans in the city were making an uproar, those who had been concerned with the Athenians and others with them, the whole mass who were in the secret, said that they ought to open the gates and go out to battle. 4. It had been agreed by them that the Athenians should rush in on the gates being opened, and they themselves intended being distinguishable, for they would anoint themselves with oil, to prevent

their being harmed unfairly. They obtained a greater security from the opening of the gates; for, according to the arrangement, the men from Eleusis, four thousand hoplites of the Athenians, and six hundred horse, who were marching all night, were close at hand. 5. When they had anointed themselves, and were already round the gates, someone in the secret denounced the plot to the other party; and they uniting together, came in a body and said it was not right either to go out against the enemy—for not even before, when they were stronger, did they venture upon this—or to plunge the city in a manifest danger; if anyone did not comply, he would have to fight then and there. 6. They gave, however, no sign that they knew what was being done, but insisted on what they said as counselling for the best; at the same time they remained on guard about the gates, so that the plotters did not succeed in doing what they intended.

LXIX.—1. When the generals of the Athenians perceived that some obstacle had arisen, and that they would not be able to take the city by a *coup de main*, they immediately began to circumvallate Nisæa, thinking that, if they took it before any rescuers came, Megara would more quickly come over to them—there were brought from Athens speedily both iron tools and masons and other necessities—and starting from the part of the wall which they held, they built a cross-wall to face the Megareans, and from that [they carried their circumvallation] on either side of Nisæa to the sea, the army taking the trench and walls in sections. They also used stones and bricks from the suburb, and cutting down the trees and brushwood, they made a palisade wherever there was any need. The houses of the suburb, getting battlements added, were in themselves a fortification to start with. They worked then the whole of this day; (3) on the next, about the afternoon, the wall was almost completed, and the men in Nisæa being afraid, both from the want of food—for what they used came every day from the upper city—and thinking that the Peloponnesians would not succour them quickly, and looking upon the Megareans as enemies, agreed with the Athenians that on giving up their arms they should be

ransomed, each man for a specified sum, and that the Athenians should do as they liked with the Lacedæmonians, both the commander and anyone else who was there. 4. Having come to an agreement on these terms, they came out. The Athenians having made breaches in the long walls from the city of the Megareans downwards, and taking over Nisæa, went on with their other preparations.

LXX.—1. Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Lacedæmonian, happened about this time to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, making preparations for an expedition in the direction of Thrace. When he was aware of the capture of the long walls, fearing both for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Bœotians, bidding them meet him with an armed force at Tripodiscus, (2) which is a village of Megaris bearing this name at the foot of the mountain Geranea; and he came himself with two thousand seven hundred hoplites of the Corinthians, four hundred of the Phliasians, six hundred of the Sicyonians, and all those of his own force that were assembled, thinking to find Nisæa still untaken. 3. As soon as he learnt the truth—for he happened to go out by night to Tripodiscus—he selected three hundred of his force, and before he could be heard of, he came up to the city of the Megareans unknown to the Athenians, as they were near the sea, wishing professedly, and at the same time if he could actually, to make an attempt on Nisæa, but chiefly to get into the city of the Megareans and secure it for his own side; he claimed also that they should receive him and his forces, saying that he was in hopes of recovering Nisæa.

LXXI.—But the factions of the Megareans, being alarmed, the one party lest he should restore their exiles and expel themselves, the other lest the popular party, in dread of this very thing, should make an attack upon them, and lest the city, being in strife with itself while the Athenians were in ambush close by, should be ruined, refused to admit him; but both sides thought it best to keep quiet and watch the course of events: for either party hoped that a battle would take place between the Athenians and those who had come to the rescue, and thus

it would be safer for them to go over to whichever side they favoured, when it was victorious; but when Brasidas could not prevail upon them, he withdrew again to the rest of his army.

LXXII.—1. With the dawn, the Bœotians were at hand, for they had purposed even before Brasidas sent to come to Megara to the rescue, considering that it was not a foreign danger, and were already in full force at Plataea; but when the messenger came they were much more resolute, and, despatching two thousand two hundred hoplites and six hundred horsemen, they went back again with the larger part. 2. As the whole force was now present, not less than six thousand hoplites, and the Athenians had their hoplites drawn up about Nisæa and the sea coast, while the light troops had dispersed up and down the plain, the cavalry of the Bœotians, falling upon the light troops when they did not expect it, drove them in confusion to the sea: for before this no reinforcement had come yet from any quarter to the Megareans. Those on the Athenian side, riding out against them, came to blows, and a cavalry action went on for some time, in which both sides claim not to have got the worst. For when the commander of the Bœotians and a small number of others rode up to Nisæa itself, the Athenians slew and stripped them; having possession of these dead bodies, they gave them up under a truce and set up a trophy: yet in the whole action they parted without either side reaching a decided issue, the Bœotians to their own men, the others to Nisæa.

LXXIII.—1. After this Brasidas and his army advanced nearer the sea and the city of the Megareans, and finding a suitable spot, they formed in order of battle, but remained stationary, thinking that the Athenians would attack them, and knowing that the Megareans were looking to see which side would have the victory. 2. They thought that both circumstances looked well for them, as well as their not being the first to attack nor voluntarily to enter upon the dangers of battle, whereas they had openly shown that they were ready to defend themselves, and the victory might justly be set down to them, as it were, without an effort: at the same time, matters were turning out well with regard to

the Megareans. 3. For if they had not been seen to come, they would not have had even a chance, but plainly they would have been deprived of the city just as if they had been defeated; but now it might happen even that the Athenians themselves did not choose to enter into a contest with them, so that the objects for which they came would accrue to them without fighting: and thus, in fact, it came to pass. 4. For the Megareans, when the Athenians came out and formed in line along the walls, and yet they, too, remained stationary, since the other side did not advance (their generals also reckoning that since the greater part of their operations had met with success, the risk was not equally matched for them, in beginning a battle against superior numbers, either, if victors, to take Megara, or, if defeated, to be damaged in the flower of their hoplite force; while on the other side each part of their whole force and of those present on the field was, with reason, willing to venture upon the danger); but having waited some time, when nothing was attempted on either side, the Athenians went away first to Nisæa, and the Peloponnesians again to the position from which they set out. Thus, then, as Brasidas was master of the situation and the Athenians were no longer willing to fight, the Megareans, who were friendly to the exiles, growing more confident, opened the gates to him and to the commanders from the different states: after welcoming them, they entered into conference, those who had been concerned with the Athenians having been at length cowed into silence.

LXXIV.—1. Afterwards, when the allies had dispersed to their own cities, he himself going to Corinth, went on preparing for his expedition to Thrace, the point for which he had started at first; and of the Megareans in the city, when the Athenians also had departed homewards, all who had had the chief share in the dealings with the Athenians, knowing that they were marked men, immediately stole away; (2) but the rest, entering into conference with the friends of the exiles, bring back the men at Pegæ, making them swear by strong pledges that they would bear no malice for the past, but would advise what was best for the city. But when they got into office they held an

inspection of arms, stationing the *lochi* in separate places ; they then picked out some of their personal enemies and those who appeared to have had most to do with the Athenians, to the number of a hundred. Respecting these they compelled the people to give an open vote, and when they were condemned they put them to death, and put the city for the most part on an oligarchical footing. This change from a state of faction, though brought about by a very few, lasted a very long time.

LXXV.—1. The same summer, when Antandros was on the point of being put into defensive condition by the Mytilenæans, as was their intention, the generals of the Athenians who were levying contributions, Demodocus and Aristides, being in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont—for Lamachus, their third colleague, had sailed into the Pontus with ten ships—when they perceived the preparations going on in the place, and thought there was ground for fear that it would prove to be just what Anæa was to Samos, where the exiles from the Samians established themselves, and then proceeded to help the Peloponnesians in their naval movements by sending them pilots to throw the Samians in the city into confusion and welcome the disaffected who came out—with these views, then collecting a force from their allies, they sailed thither, and, conquering in battle those who came out against them from Antandros, recovered the place. 3. Not long after Lamachus, having sailed to the Pontus, and coming to an anchorage in the river Calix, in the territory of Heraclea, lost his ships through rain falling up the country and the stream coming down with sudden force. He himself and his army marched by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who are on the other side in Asia, and arrived at Chalcedon, the Megareans' colony, at the mouth of the Pontus.

LXXVI.—1. In the course of the same summer also Demosthenes, the Athenian general, arrived with forty ships at Naupactus, immediately after the retreat from Megaris. For intrigues respecting affairs in Boeotia were being entered into with him and Hippocrates on the part of certain men in the cities who wished to change the form of government and turn it into a democracy, like the

Athenians. 2. Preparatory steps were taken by them as follows, chiefly at the instigation of Ptœodorus, an exile from Thebes—some persons were intending to betray Siphæ to them; (Siphæ is a town of the Thespian country, on the Crisæan gulf, by the seashore)—others from Orchomenus were proposing to give up Chæronea, which is dependent on Orchomenus, formerly called the Minyan, but now Bœotian. 3. The exiles from Orchomenus were co-operating with them most actively, and hiring men from Peloponnesus. Now, Chæronea is the furthest town of Bœotia, close to the territory of Phanoteus in Phocis, and some of the Phocians joined with them in the plot. The Athenians were to occupy Delium, the sacred precinct of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra, which faces Eubœa, and these things were to take place at the same time on a specified day, that the Bœotians might not bring help to Delium in a body, but have to go each to their own districts where there was a disturbance. 4. If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, they readily entertained the hope, even if some revolutionary change in their constitutions was not immediately made by the Bœotians, yet when these posts were occupied and the land was being ravaged and each party had a refuge close by, matters would not remain as they were; but in time, as the Athenians joined the disaffected, and the others had their forces disunited, they would settle matters as suited them.

LXXVII.—1. This, then, was the kind of plot in preparation, and Hippocrates was himself going to march against the Bœotians with a force from the city when there was an opportunity, and he sent forward Demosthenes with the forty ships to Naupactus, that after collecting an army from those districts and from the Acarnanians and the rest of the allies, he might sail against Siphæ, with the expectation of its being betrayed to him, and a day had been named by them on which they were to do these things simultaneously. When Demosthenes arrived he found that Oeniadæ had been forced by all the Acarnanians into alliance with the Athenians, and himself raised the whole body of allies that were there; after this he marched against Salynthus and the Agræans, and having won them

over, made his other preparations with the intention of presenting himself at Siphæ when it was the proper time.

LXXVIII.—1. About the same period of the summer Brasidas began his march to the country on the borders of Thrace, with one thousand seven hundred hoplites. When he arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, and on his sending forward a messenger to his connections in Pharsalus with a request that they should conduct him and his army through the country, there came to Melitia in Achaia Panærus, Dorus, Hippolochidas and Torylaus, Strophæus also, who was *provenus* of the Chalcidians; then he at once proceeded on his march. 2. Among other Thessalians who escorted him was Niconidas from Larissa, a connection of Perdiccas. For on other grounds it was not easy to pass through Thessaly without an escort, and to go through a neighbour's territory with an armed force without having obtained permission had come to be looked upon as suspicious by all the Greeks alike. 3. The mass of the Thessalians were always well disposed to the Athenians, so that if the Thessalians, as was usual in the country, had not been under an oligarchy, rather than a constitutional government, he would never have made his way; since even then some others, whose wishes were opposed to the above named, met him on the river Enipeus, and were for stopping him, saying that it was wrong of him to advance without the authority of the whole body. 4. His conductors said that they should not take him through against their will, and that on his arriving unexpectedly they were showing him attention as friends. Brasidas himself said that he was coming as a friend to the Thessalians and their country, that he was bearing arms against the Athenians, his enemies, and not against them, and he did not know that there was any enmity between the Thessalians and the Lacedæmonians to prevent them making use of one another's land; and now, if they were unwilling he should not go on, for he would not be able, yet he desired that he might not be stopped. 5. On hearing this they went away, and he, at the bidding of his conductors, went on before any greater force could be got together to hinder him, not slackening at all in his speed. So on this day on

which he started from Melitia he completed his march to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus, thence to Phacium, and from there to Perhæbia. From this point at length his Thessalian conductors went back, and the Perhæbians, subjects of the Thessalians, saw him safe to Dium, in the dominions of Perdiccas, which, though a town of Macedonia, lies close to Olympus, facing the Thessalians.

LXXIX.—In this manner Brasidas made a rapid march through Thessaly before anyone could make preparations to hinder him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. For as the cause of the Athenians was prospering, both those who had revolted in the neighbourhood of Thrace and Perdiccas, inspired by fear, got the army to come from Peloponnesus, the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians' first onslaught would be upon themselves—and the cities near them that had not revolted secretly helped to lead them on, Perdiccas also not being openly hostile, but feeling some fear himself because of his old differences with the Athenians, and most of all wishing to bring to terms Arrhibæus, the king of the Lyncestians. A circumstance which made it more easy for them to bring out the force from Peloponnesus was the ill-success of the Lacedæmonians at the time.

LXXX.—For as the Athenians were pressing hard upon Peloponnesus, and most of all upon their own country, they hoped to divert their forces most effectually if they inflicted some counter-annoyance by sending a force against their allies, especially as the latter were ready to support it, and were inviting them to come with the view of revolting. At the same time they welcomed it as a pretext for sending out some of the Helots, lest they should attempt some revolutionary movement in view of present circumstances and in consequence of the occupation of Pylos; since through fear of their young blood and large numbers they had even done as follows—for it was always the case that most of the measures taken by the Lacedæmonians with regard to the Helots were grounded especially upon caution—they announced publicly that all of them who claimed to have been most serviceable to them in action against the enemy should offer themselves for selection, as if they meant to free them, making this a test, and thinking that those who put for-

ward each one for himself the first claim to freedom would, from their high spirit, be most likely to make an attack upon them. When they had made a selection to the number of two thousand, the objects of their choice put on wreaths and went round to the temples like men who had been set free, and the government not long after put them out of the way, yet no one perceived in what way each one was despatched. At this time also they gladly sent six hundred of them with Brasidas as hoplites; the rest he took out from Peloponnesus, obtaining their services for pay. It was at Brasidas' own wish that the Lacedæmonians sent him out.

LXXXI.—1. The Chalcidians also were eager for him, as in Sparta itself he appeared to be a man of energy in all departments, and when he went away from home he had proved to be of very great value to the Lacedæmonians. For in the immediate present, by showing himself just and moderate towards the states, he brought most of the towns to revolt, while he took some of them by means of treachery with the result to the Lacedæmonians that when they wished to make terms, as they actually did, they had the power of giving back and receiving various places, and relief by the removal of the war from Peloponnesus; (2) and for the war in the future after the end of operations in Sicily, Brasidas' good qualities and ability shown at this time, which some were aware of by experience and others estimated by hearsay, more than anything else inspired the allies of the Athenians with a desire to join the Lacedæmonians; for being the first to come out, and appearing to be a good man in all respects, he left behind a sure hope that the others were just like himself.

LXXXII.—When, then, he had arrived at this time in the neighbourhood of Thrace, the Athenians, hearing the news, declared Perdiccas an enemy, regarding him as the cause of the passage along the country, and established a closer watch on their allies in that quarter.

LXXXIII.—1. Perdiccas, immediately taking Brasidas and his army along with his own force, marched against Arrhibæus, the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, whose territories adjoined his, as he had a

difference with him and wished to subdue him ; but when, in Brasidas' company, he had reached with his army the entrance into Lyncus, Brasidas said that he wished, before making war, first to go and, if he could, make Arrhibæus an ally of the Lacedæmonians by persuasion ; (2) for Arrhibæus sent a herald with a message, being ready to leave the matter to the decision of Brasidas as a mediator. The Chalcidians' ambassadors also, who were with him, gave him a hint not to clear all dangers away before Perdiccas, that they might have the benefit of more zealous co-operation from him for their own objects. Likewise the deputies from Perdiccas had said something of this kind at Lacedæmon, that he would bring many of the places about him into alliance with them ; so that on such grounds as these Brasidas claimed the power of dealing jointly with Arrhibæus. 3. Perdiccas, on the other hand, said that he had not brought Brasidas in as a judge in their differences, but rather as a means of overthrowing the enemies he should point out, and that he would do wrong if he sided with Arrhibæus when he himself was supporting half his army ; but he, against Perdiccas' will and after a quarrel with him, had a meeting with Arrhibæus, and, yielding to his representations, led away his army before effecting an entrance into his country. Perdiccas after this gave the third part instead of half of the food required, thinking himself to be wronged.

LXXXIV.—1. In the course of the same summer Brasidas, in company with the Chalcidians, at once marched against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians, a little before the vintage. The inhabitants formed two parties among themselves on the question of receiving him—those who joined the Chalcidians in inviting him and the people generally. 2. Nevertheless, through fear for their fruit crop, which was still abroad, the multitude being urged by Brasidas to admit him by himself and to decide after hearing what he had to say, admitted him ; and taking his place before the multitude—he was not wanting in power to speak, considering he was a Lacedæmonian—he spoke as follows :

LXXXV.—1. 'The sending forth of me and my army by

the Lacedæmonians, men of Acanthus, has taken place so as to substantiate the cause, which we publicly alleged when beginning the war, that we should carry it on against the Athenians as the liberators of Greece ; and if we have been some time coming, falling short of the expectation derived from the war yonder, on the ground of which we hoped speedily to overthrow the Athenians without danger to you, let no one blame us. 2. For now, when a chance offered, we have come, and with your assistance will try to subdue them ; but I wonder at my exclusion from your gates, and that I do not find you glad at my arrival. For we Lacedæmonians, both thinking that we should come among men who even before we arrived were our allies at least in feeling, and that our coming would be agreeable to you, both risked this great danger in making a march of many days through a foreign country and showing all possible readiness ; and it would be strange if you have any other idea, or if you shall set yourselves against your own freedom and that of the other Greeks ; for you not only offer opposition yourselves, but whoever I come to, any one of them will be less inclined to join me, making it a difficulty that you, to whom I first came, representing as you do a considerable city, and having a reputation for good sense, did not receive me. 4. Moreover, I shall have no trustworthy cause to show, but (shall seem) either to be bringing upon you a freedom that has no foundation in justice, or to have come weak and powerless to assist them against the Athenians, if they march against me. Yet when I went to the rescue of Nisæa with an army which I now have here, the Athenians were unwilling to engage with it, though they had the advantage in numbers, so that it is not likely that with an army conveyed in ships they should send against you a host equal to the force at Nisæa.

LXXXVI.—1. ‘I have come among you both as concerns myself, not for the injury, but the liberation of the Greeks, and after binding the authorities of the Lacedæmonians by the strongest oaths, that whomsoever I may gain over shall certainly be independent allies, and at the same time with no purpose of keeping you in our alliance when we have got you on our side, either by violence or deceit, but, on the

contrary, to fight on your side, enslaved, as you are, by the Athenians. 2. Therefore, I claim that I should neither personally be an object of suspicion, offering at any rate the strongest pledges, nor be thought a powerless champion; but that you should take courage, and come over to me. Also, if anyone is backward for private reasons, through fear of some person in particular, lest I should put the city into the hands of certain individuals, let him, above all, be confident. 3. For I am not come to act as a partisan, nor do I think that the freedom I offer you is uncertain (as it would be), if slighting hereditary attachments, I were to enslave the larger number to the few or the smaller number to the whole; for that would be more vexatious than foreign dominion, and we Lacedæmonians should find no thanks obtained in return for our labour, but rather blame instead of honour and glory; and whereas we are making war to the uttermost against the Athenians, on the ground of what we lay to their charge, we ourselves should appear to be bringing down upon ourselves more hateful charges than a man who made no show of underlying worth: for it is more disgraceful in men of reputation to aggrandize themselves by specious deceit than by open violence; for the one makes its advance on the plea of strength that fortune gives, the other by the intriguing of unrighteous principle. So great caution, you see, we exercise in matters which affect our interests in the highest degree.

LXXXVII.—1. ‘Moreover, you will not get, in addition to oaths, a greater security than that offered by men whose deeds, when looked at narrowly in the light of their words, convey an unavoidable belief that their interest lies the same way as their speech. Now, if when I make these proposals you shall say that you are powerless (to accept them), and shall claim on the ground of your goodwill not to be ill-used for rejecting them, and that freedom appears to you to be not without its dangers, and that it is just to put freedom before those who also have power to accept it, but to force it upon no one against his will; I shall call to witness the Gods and heroes of your country, that though I am come for your good I cannot prevail upon you, and shall try to force you by ravaging your land. Moreover, I shall

not think after this that I am doing any injustice, but that I further have reason on my side by two cogent arguments; first, on the part of the Lacedæmonians, that they shall not, owing to your kindly feeling, if you are not brought over to our side, be injured by the tribute paid by you from time to time to the Athenians, and that the Greeks may not be hindered by you from getting rid of slavery. 3. For in that case it would not be reasonable in us to act as we are doing, nor are we Lacedæmonians bound on the score of any advantage not common to all, to set those free who do not wish it. Nor, on the other hand, are we aiming at dominion, but rather, being eager to check others, we should act unjustly to the majority, if when putting independence before all we should take no notice of you who set yourselves against it. 4. Wherefore, come to a sound conclusion, and strive to take the first step in obtaining freedom for the Greeks, and to lay up for yourselves everlasting glory; strive, moreover, yourselves to avoid damage in your private interests and to invest the state with a most honourable name.'

LXXXVIII.—Thus much Brasidas said; the Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides, giving their votes by ballot either way, both on account of the persuasiveness of Brasidas' speech and through fear for their fruit crop, resolved by a majority to revolt from the Athenians, and having bound him by the oaths which the authorities of the Lacedæmonians swore when they sent him out, viz., that all the allies whom he won over should be independent—on this understanding they admit his army. Not long after, Stagirus, also a colony of the Andrians, joined in their defection. These, then, were the events of this summer.

LXXXIX.—1. In the following winter, quite at its commencement, as the operations among the Bœotians were to be put into the hands of Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians at the time, and Demosthenes was to present himself with his ships before Siphæ, and the other at Delium, a mistake having been made in reckoning the days by which both were to march, (2) Demosthenes sailing first to Siphæ with some Acarnanians on board and many of the allies there, failed in his object, for the plot

had been made known by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanoteus, who told it to the Lacedæmonians, and they to the Bœotians. 3. A march to rescue being made by all the Bœotians (for Hippocrates was not yet in the country effecting a diversion), Siphæ and Chæronea are occupied beforehand. When the intriguers perceived the mistake, they made no movement as regarded the cities.

XC.—1. Hippocrates, making a levy *en masse* of the Athenians themselves, the metics, and all the foreigners that were there, arrived too late at Delium, as the Bœotians had already retired from Siphæ. Having encamped his army, he proceeded to fortify Delium, the sacred precinct of Apollo, in the following way. 2. They dug a trench in a circle round the precinct and the temple, and from the excavation they threw up the earth to serve for a wall; then fixing palisades along each side, they cut down the vines that grew round the precinct, and threw them in, likewise stones and bricks, taking them down from the buildings near, and in every way they tried to raise the bulwark high. 3. They also set up wooden towers, where there was a good place, and where there was no building belonging to the precinct; for the colonnade that had been there had fallen down. Beginning the third day after they started from home, they worked that day, and the fourth, and a part of the fifth till dinner. 4. Afterwards, when the greater part had been finished, the army advanced from Delium about ten stadia, as if they were marching homewards, and the greater part of the light-armed straightway continued their march, but the hoplites halted and remained stationary. Hippocrates, staying longer, was arranging for guards and how they should complete the parts belonging to the outwork that were left undone.

XCI.—In the course of these days the Bœotians were mustering at Tanagra; and when they arrived there from all their cities and perceived that the Athenians were on their way homewards, the other Bœotarchs, who are eleven in number, did not join in advising a battle, since the enemy were no longer in Bœotia. For the Athenians were somewhere about the borders of the Oropian territory when they halted; but Pagondas, the son of Æolidas, being

Bœotarch from Thebes, along with Arianthidas, the son of Lysimachidas, both wishing to bring on the battle while he had the command, and thinking that it was better to run a risk, called together each contingent, a *lochos* at a time, that they might not leave the place of arms altogether, and tried to persuade the Bœotians to go against the Athenians, and enter upon the struggle, saying as follows :

XCII.—1. ‘Men of Bœotia, it does not behove any of our commanders to entertain the notion that it is not proper to engage with the Athenians if we find them in a place which after all is not in Bœotia. For it is Bœotia that they have come into from the adjoining territory, and that they are intending to lay waste after building a fort in it, and they are, I presume, enemies in whatever place they are found, especially in the place whence they started to commit acts of hostility ; and now, if anyone thought it safer (not to fight), let him change his opinion ; for when men are attacked by someone else, prudence does not admit of nice reasoning as to what is their own land, as it does in the case of a man who is in possession of his own land, but through eagerness for more of his own accord goes to attack someone else. It is also a tradition with you to repel a foreign army that comes against you alike in your own and in your neighbours’ land. 3. Besides this we must repel the Athenians far more than anyone else, as they dwell on our borders : for in dealing with near neighbours all find that to be a match for them is also to be free, and in dealing with these particularly, who are trying to enslave, I do not say those near them, but also those far off, ought we not to carry the struggle to extremities ? Now, in the Eubœans, across the strait, and in the rest of Greece we have an example of how it stands disposed towards them—and to make up our minds that others have neighbours going to battle with them about the boundaries of their land, but that we, if we are conquered, shall have one boundary fixed for the whole of our country which is not to be disputed ; for they will come in and take by force all that we have : so much more dangerous than others shall we find the near neighbourhood of these people. 5. Again, it is usual that those who make an attack on their neigh-

bours in the confidence of strength, as the Athenians are doing now, march more unhesitatingly against one who remains stationary and repels an attack in his own country only; but one who advances to meet them beyond his boundaries, and begins the war, if he has an opportunity, they less readily overbear. 6. Of this we have a practical proof with regard to these men; for by conquering them at Coronea, when, owing to our dissensions, they overran the country, we established full security for Bœotia up to the present time. These things we must remember, the elder men must produce a resemblance to their deeds at that time, and the younger, as the sons of fathers who then proved brave men, try not to shame the virtues inherent in their race. 7. Wherefore, relying upon the God to be on our side whose temple they have lawlessly turned into a fort and are still occupying, and on the victims which appear to us favourable at our sacrifice, we should go to meet these men, and show that, what they aim at, let them get by making an attack on people who do not defend themselves, but that from men whose native pride it is always to free their own country by fighting, and to refrain from enslaving others wrongfully, from these they will not go away without a struggle.'

XCIII.—1. By addressing such exhortations as these to the Bœotians, Pagondas persuaded them to march against the Athenians, and quickly setting his army in motion, he led them forth, for it was, besides, already late in the day; when he came near to their army, posting his force at a point whence they could not see one another because of a hill that lay between, he drew up his men and made preparations for battle. 2. When it was reported to Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, that the Bœotians were coming against him, he sent orders to the army to form in line; he came himself not long after, leaving about three hundred horse about Delium, that they might serve as guards, if anyone came against it, and might watch their opportunity to act as a reserve against the Bœotians in the battle. Against these the Bœotians drew up men to repel their attack; and when everything was well arranged by them, they showed themselves above the crest of the hill and

halted, drawn up as they intended to fight, seven thousand hoplites or thereabouts, with more than ten thousand light troops, a thousand horse and five hundred peltasts. 4. The right wing was held by the Thebans and their dependents, the centre by the men of Haliartus, Coroneia, Copais, and the rest of the people about the lake; the left wing was held by the men of Thespieæ, Tanagra and Orchomenus; the cavalry and light troops were on either wing; the Thebans formed their line twenty-five deep, the rest, as each happened to be accustomed. These, then, were the preparations, and this the disposition of the Bœotians.

XCIV.—1. On the Athenian side the hoplites throughout the army formed eight deep, though in numbers they were a match for their adversaries, with cavalry on either wing. Of light troops, regularly armed, there were none present at the time, nor were there any trained in the city. 2. Those who joined in the invasion—many times more numerous than their opponents—had followed for the most part imperfectly armed, seeing that a levy *en masse* was made of the foreigners present and citizens; and as they had at first started for home, they did not turn up, excepting a few. When they had taken their places in line, and were now about to engage, Hippocrates the general, passing along the army of the Athenians, addressed them in the following words:

XCV.—‘Athenians, my address is made to you at short notice, but it has an equal efficacy with brave men, and contains rather a reminder than an exhortation. Let it occur to no one of you that it is in a foreign country where it is not proper that we incur this great danger; for though waged in these men’s territory, the contest will be for our own. If we conquer, there is no fear that the Peloponnesians will ever invade our territory without these men’s cavalry, and in one battle you will acquire the land before you and give greater freedom to that yonder. Advance, then, against them in a manner worthy of the city in which each of you prides himself upon having a native country of the first rank among the Greeks, and of your fathers, who by mastering these men in battle with Myronides at Œenophyta at one time held Bœotia.’

XCVI.—1. Hippocrates, while giving these exhortations, had gone on as far as the centre of the army, but was not in time to go further; for the Bœotians, when Pagondas had exhorted them too at this point also, as the hurry permitted, broke out with the pæan and advanced from the hill; the Athenians, too, advanced to meet them, and they encountered them at the double; the extremes of either army did not come to blows, but were both in the same case, for they were prevented by mountain torrents; (2) but the rest closed in a fierce fight and thrusting with shields. The left wing of the Bœotians was worsted by the Athenians even up to the centre, and they pressed hard in this quarter upon the Thespians especially. For when those who were stationed next them had given way, and the Thespians were surrounded in a narrow space, those of them who fell were cut down while defending themselves hand to hand. 3. Some of the Athenians, too, being confused on account of having encircled their foes, mistook their men and killed one another. So the part of the Bœotian force that was in this quarter was worsted and fell back on that which was still fighting; but the right wing, in which the Thebans were, had the better of the Athenians, and, driving them back by degrees at first, began to follow them up. 4. It happened, too, at the same time, through Pagondas sending two squadrons of cavalry round the hill unseen by the enemy, when their left wing was in distress, and their appearing suddenly, that the victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking another force was coming against them, was thrown into consternation; and now, in both parts of the field, in consequence of an incident like this and the Thebans pursuing and breaking their ranks, a flight set in through the whole Athenian army. Some made for Delium and the sea, some towards Oropus, others to Mount Parnes, others as each group had some hope of safety. The Bœotians pursued and killed them, especially the cavalry, both theirs and the Locrian having come to their aid just as the rout was taking place. 6. Night falling upon the action, the bulk of the fugitives more easily reached a place of safety. The next day the men from Oropus and those from Delium, leaving a guard

in it—for they still held it, in spite of their defeat—were conveyed home by sea.

XCVII.—1. The Bœotians erected a trophy, took up their own dead and stripped those of the enemy; then, leaving a guard, they retired to Tanagra, and made plans with the view of attacking Delium. 2. A herald going from the Athenians to claim the dead met a Bœotian herald; the latter turned him back saying he would effect nothing till he himself returned again; then, presenting himself before the Athenians, he told them the Bœotians' message—that they had not acted justly in transgressing the customs of the Greeks; for that it was a settled point with all of them when marching against each other's territory to keep away from the temples therein; but that the Athenians had fortified Delium, and were dwelling in it; that everything was being done there that men do on unhallowed ground, and that even the water, which was untouched by themselves except to use for lustration in sacrifices, they had drawn up and were using as ordinary water; wherefore, on the God's behalf and their own, the Bœotians, invoking Apollo and the deities who shared the temple with him, called upon them to go out of the precinct and take their belongings with them.

XCVIII.—1. When the herald had said thus much, the Athenians sent their own herald to the Bœotian quarters, saying, with regard to the temple, that they had neither done any wrong there, nor would they for the future willingly do any harm: it was not for this that they entered it to begin with, but that (issuing) from it they might avenge themselves on those who were doing them a greater wrong. 2. Again, that the law for the Greeks was, that whoever had the power over each territory, whether greater or smaller, into his possession also the holy places came, and he paid respect to them in whatever ways he could in addition to what had been customary; for the Bœotians also and many of the others, that is, all who are in possession of anyone's land, after forcibly ejecting him, coming at first to foreign temples, now possess them as their own. 3. Further, if they were able to conquer a greater extent of their land, they should keep it; and as to the part in which they now

are, they will not depart from it as far as their will was concerned, as (they would be going) from their own land. The water they had disturbed in the great need, which they had not brought on themselves by insolent pride, but they were forced to use it when repelling the other side coming first against their territory ; it was, moreover, quite reasonable that a proceeding forced on by war or some danger should come to be looked upon with some indulgence even by the God ; for the altars were a refuge in case of involuntary transgressions, and lawlessness was a name given to men who were wicked without any necessity, and not to those who took some liberty under the pressure of disasters. 5. As to the dead, the other side in claiming to restore them in exchange for temples were committing much greater impiety than those who were unwilling to recover what it was not proper they should by means of temples, and they desired them to tell them plainly that they might take up their dead, not on condition of quitting the Bœotians' land—for they were no longer in their land, but in that which they acquired in war—but on making libations according to their hereditary practice.

XCIX.—1. The Bœotians, on the other hand, answered, that 'if they were in Bœotia, they might go away and take their belongings out of their (Bœotians') land ; but if in the others' (Athenians') land, they were aware of what ought to be done.' Considering that the territory of Oropus, in which, as it happened, the dead lay, as the battle was fought on the borders, belonged to the Athenians on the ground of subjection, and yet they could not master them (Bœotians) by force ; moreover, they were not making a truce, they pretended, about the others' land ; but they said it was a plausible answer to give, that they should go away from *their* territory, and so get what they asked. The Athenians' herald, hearing this, went away without effecting anything.

C.—1. The Bœotians immediately sent for dartmen and slingers from the Malian gulf, and having received a reinforcement after the battle, of two thousand Corinthian hoplites, and the Peloponnesian garrison, who had come out of Nisæa, and likewise some Megareans, they marched

against Delium, and made an assault on the fortifications ; besides other attempts, they brought up an engine of this kind, which, in fact, took the place. 2. Sawing a great beam in two, they hollowed it all out, and fitted it again accurately in the shape of a pipe ; at the end of it, by means of chains, they hung a caldron, and into this an iron nozzle was let down slanting from the beam, and a considerable part besides of the timber was plated with iron. They brought it on waggons from a good way off, up to the wall, at the part where it was chiefly built of the vines and wood ; and as soon as it was near, they put great bellows into the end of the beam that was on their side and blew ; the blast, going through the closed tube into the caldron, which contained live coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great flame and set fire to the wall, so that no one could stay any longer upon it, but left it and took to flight, and the fort was captured in this way. Some of the garrison were killed, but two hundred were taken prisoners, and the bulk of the other troops, going on board the ships, were conveyed home.

CI.—1. Delium was taken on the seventeenth day after the battle ; the herald of the Athenians not knowing anything of what had happened, and coming back shortly after respecting the dead, the Bœotians gave them up and no more made the same answer. 2. There fell in the battle of the Bœotians a little less than five hundred, and of the Athenians a little less than a thousand ; among them Hippocrates, their general, and a great number of light troops and camp-followers. A short time after this battle Demosthenes also, seeing that on his voyage at that time the affair at Siphæ had not come off well as regards the betrayal of the place, and as he had on board the ships the army of Acarnanians and Agræans, and four hundred hoplites of the Athenians, made a descent on the territory of Sicyon. 3. Before all the ships reached the land, the Sicyonians came to the rescue and put to flight those who had landed, and pursued them to their ships, killing some and taking others alive ; then, setting up a trophy, they gave up the dead under a truce. 4. About the same time as the events at Delium, Sitalces, king of the

Odryse died, when he had marched against the Triballi and had been defeated in battle; and Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus, a nephew of his, became king over the Odryse and the other part of Thrace which he also had ruled.

CII.—1. The same winter Brasidas marched with the allies in the neighbourhood of Thrace to Amphipolis, the Athenians' colony on the river Strymon. Earlier attempts were made to settle a colony in this spot, upon which the city now stands, by Aristagoras the Milesian, when he fled from King Darius, but he was driven out by the Edonians, and afterwards by the Athenians two-and-thirty years later, sending ten thousand colonists of themselves and any one of the rest who chose to go, and these were cut off by the Thracians at Drabescus. 2. In the twenty-ninth year afterwards, the Athenians came again, Hagnon, the son of Nicias being sent out as leader of the colony, and driving out the Edonians they founded this place, which was formerly called the Nine Ways; they set out from Eion, which they themselves held, a maritime trading town at the mouth of the river five-and-twenty stadia distant from the present city, which Hagnon named Amphipolis, because, as the Strymon flows round it on both sides, for the sake of surrounding it entirely, he cut it off with a long wall from river to river, and built the place so as to be seen all round both towards the sea and towards the mainland.

CIII.—1. Against this, then, Brasidas advanced with his army, setting sail from Arnæ, in Chalcidice; arriving in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe discharges into the sea, he made the men take their supper, and marched during the night. 2. The weather was stormy, and it was snowing a little, for which reason he was the more eager, wishing to come unknown to the people in Amphipolis, except those who proposed to give it up to him, for there were some of the Argilians dwelling in it—the Argilians are colonists of the Andrians—and others who joined in these intrigues, some influenced by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians. 3. Most of all the Argilians, as they dwelt near, and were from former time objects of suspicion to the Athenians, and were plotting against the

place when the opportunity occurred and Brasidas came, intrigued still further with those of their number that were dwelling there, that the city might be surrendered, and then receiving him into their city and revolting from the Athenians, on that night they saw his army safe on their way up to the bridge over the river. 4. Now, the town is some distance from the crossing, and walls were not carried down to it as now, but a slender guard was placed there. This Brasidas easily overpowered, as well from the existence of treachery as from its being stormy weather, and because he fell upon them unexpectedly; he then crossed the bridge, and immediately got into his hands all the possessions of the Amphipolitans outside the walls, dwelling as they did all over the district.

CIV.—1. His crossing having been made too suddenly for those in the city, when, of those outside, some were taken prisoners and others fled within the fortifications, the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspicious of one another; and it is said that if Brasidas had chosen not to take to plundering with his army, but had advanced straight into the city, it was thought that he might have taken it. 2. As it was, he put his army into quarters and then made a rush upon what was outside, and as he found nothing came off on the part of those inside, as he expected, he kept quiet. The party opposed to the traitors overpowered them by means of the general mass of citizens, so as to prevent the gates from being opened immediately, and with the approval of Eucles, the general, who was there among them from the Athenians in charge of the place, they sent to the other commander of the parts about Thrace, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, who wrote this account, as he was near Thasos —(3) the island is a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail—desiring him to come to their aid. On hearing this he sailed with all speed with seven ships that happened to be there, wishing chiefly to reach Amphipolis before anything was done in the way of surrender, otherwise to seize Eion beforehand.

CV.—1. Meanwhile Brasidas, both fearing the reinforcement by the ships from Thasos, and learning that Thucy-

dides had possession of a right to work the gold mines in the part of Thrace near there, and from this circumstance had influence among the chief men on the continent, was eager to get possession of the city before him if he could, lest on his arrival the mass of the Amphipolitans should hope that he would assemble a force of allies from the sea-board and from Thrace, and so make them secure, and that then they would no longer think of going over to him. 2. Thus he was for making the terms of surrender moderate, sending this proclamation by a herald, that any one of the Amphipolitans and Athenians inside who wished might remain in possession of his property on fair and equal terms, and that anyone who did not wish might go away and take his property with him within five days.

CVI.—1. The majority, hearing this, became rather changed in their opinions, especially as there was but a small section of Athenians among the citizens; but the greater part was a mixed population, and there were many connections inside of those who had been caught outside; thus, having regard to their fears, they took the proclamation to be just—the Athenians, because of being glad to go out, thinking that their danger was not on a level with others, and, at the same time, because they did not expect assistance quickly; and the rest of the assemblage because they were not being deprived of their right as citizens, as well as because they were getting clear of danger contrary to their expectation. So that as those who were working for Brasidas were now even openly justifying the proposals, (since they saw the populace had been put to the rout in their sentiments, and were no longer listening to the general of the Athenians, who was present) the surrender was made, and they received Brasidas on the terms he announced. In this kind of way they gave up the city, and Thucydides, with his ships, was sailing into port at Eion late on this day. Brasidas had just gained Amphipolis and came within a night of taking Eion, for if the ships had not speedily come to the rescue it would have been in his hands by morning.

CVII.—1. After this the one made arrangements in Eion that he might keep it in safety both for the present, if

Brasidas should come against it, and for the future, receiving those who chose to come to him from up the river, according to the treaty ; and the other, making an attempt against Eion, both on the side of the river by sailing down suddenly with many vessels, to try if by seizing the headland which juts out from the wall he could make himself master of the entrance to the harbour, and by land, at the same time, was beaten off on both sides, and went on with his arrangements at Amphipolis. 2. Myrcinus also went over to him, an Edonian city—Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and Brauro, his wife—and not long after Galepsus and Oesume ; these are colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas also was with him immediately after the capture, and took part in these arrangements.

CVIII.—1. Now that Amphipolis was held by the enemy the Athenians were thrown into a great state of fear, especially because the city was useful to them, both by sending timber for shipbuilding and by the revenue paid in money, and because the Lacedæmonians had a passage as far as the Strymon against their allies, if the Thessalians guided them ; but not being masters of the bridge, as there was above a large lake of great extent formed by the river, and on the side towards Eion being watched by triremes, they would not be able to push on. But then matters were thought to have been at length made easy. 2. They feared, too, lest the allies should revolt ; for Brasidas, besides showing himself moderate in other matters, everywhere made it manifest by words that he was sent out for the purpose of liberating Greece. The cities, too, which were subject to the Athenians, learning the capture of Amphipolis, and the terms that he offered, and his gentleness, were more than ever excited to attempt a revolution, and kept making overtures to him secretly, desiring him to come their way, and wishing each one to be the first to revolt. For it appeared to them that there was no ground for fear, being deceived in their estimate of the Athenian power to as great an extent as that power proved great on trial, and, on the other hand, deciding more according to ill-founded desire than by well-founded forethought, being accustomed, after

the fashion of men when they desire a thing, to commit it to unreflecting hope, and when they do not take to a thing to thrust it away entirely by arbitrary reasoning. 4. At the same time, since the Athenians had lately received a crushing blow in Bœotia, and Brasidas was saying things that were tempting instead of the real truth, viz., that the Athenians were unwilling to engage with him at Nisæa when he had only his own army, they took courage and believed that no one would come as a reinforcement against them ; but most of all, on account of what involved pleasure for the moment, and because they were going for the first time to have a taste of the Lacedæmonians, when their blood was up they were ready to run risks in every way. 5. Perceiving this, the Athenians sent garrisons here and there into the cities, as well as they could at short notice and in the winter, and he sending messages to Sparta, desired them to send him an additional force, and himself began to prepare for building triremes on the Strymon. The Lacedæmonians, however, did not second his views, partly from envy originating with the chief men, and partly because they had a greater wish to recover the men from the island, and to put an end to the war.

CIX.—1. The same winter the Megareans took their long walls, which the Athenians had held, and razed them to the ground, and Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the promontory called Acte. It projects this way from the king's dyke, and Athos, which belongs to it, a lofty mountain, is the end of it, running out into the Ægean Sea. 2. The cities it contains are Sane, a colony of the Andrians, close beside the dyke, facing the sea towards Eubœa, and besides Thyssus, Cleonæ, Acrothooi, Olophyxus and Dium ; these are inhabited by mingled tribes of barbarians, speaking Greek as well as their own language. There is also a small Chalcidian element among them, but most of all a Pelasgian, of those Tyrrhenians who formerly settled in Lemnos and Athens ; also a Bisaltic and Crestonic, besides Edonians ; now they dwell in small towns. The majority went over to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium stood out ; so staying in their country, he ravaged it with his army.

CX.—1. When they did not listen to him he marched immediately to Torone, the Chalcidian town, which was held by the Athenians—a few having invited him, being ready to betray the city. Arriving while it was yet night, but towards break of day, he encamped with his army close to the temple of the Dioscuri, which is distant from the city about three stadia. 2. He was not observed by the rest of the city of the Toronæans nor by the Athenians who garrisoned it; but those who were working for him, knowing that he must be come, some few even going over to him secretly, were watching for his arrival, and when they perceived that he was there, they took in to themselves seven light-armed men with daggers—for these were all out of twenty men at first appointed who were not afraid to enter; their leader was Lysistratus, an Olynthian: they got through the wall that faces the sea and escaped observation, then going up to the watch-post on the highest ground, the city standing against a hill, they despatched the guards there, and proceeded to break through the postern towards Canastraeum.

CXI.—1. Brasidas was keeping quiet with the rest of his army, and only advancing a little, but sent forward a hundred peltasts, so that as soon as ever any of the gates were opened and the signal agreed upon was raised, they might rush in first. As time went on, and they were in a state of wonder, they happened to advance little by little near to the city. 2. Those of the Toronæans who were making preparations inside with the men who had gone in, when they had got the postern broken through and the gates towards the market-place were being opened by cutting through the bar, first led some men round the walls and admitted them at the postern, that they might suddenly alarm from behind and on both sides those in the city who knew nothing about it; then they raised the fire-signal as they had been told, and at length admitted the rest of the peltasts through the gates by the market-place.

CXII.—Brasidas, seeing the signal, began to run at full speed, setting in motion his army, which raised a shout all together and caused great consternation to those in the city; some immediately rushed in by the gates, others

along some squared beams which happened to be lying against the part of the wall that had fallen and was being built up, for the purpose of hauling up stones. Brasidas then, with the bulk of his army, at once took his way upwards to the higher parts of the city, wishing to take it from top to bottom and to make sure of it: the rest of the crowd were dispersing in like manner all over the place.

CXIII.—While the capture of Torone was being effected, the majority, knowing nothing, were in confusion, but the conspirators and those who approved of these proceedings were at once with those who came in. The Athenians—for there happened to be about fifty hoplites sleeping in the market-place—when they perceived the state of things, some few fell in a hand-to-hand fight; of the rest, some fleeing by land, others to the ships, of which there were two on guard, made their way safely to Lecythus, the outpost, which they had seized and were holding, a high part of the city running out into the sea and cut off on a narrow isthmus. All the Toronæans also who were friendly to them took refuge with them.

CXIV.—1. When at length day broke and the city was held securely, Brasidas caused proclamation to be made to the Toronæans who had made their escape along with the Athenians, that anyone who chose might come to his own and enjoy a citizen's rights without fear, but to the Athenians he sent a herald and bade them go out of Lecythus under a truce and taking their property with them, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians. 2. They refused to leave, and desired him to make a truce with them for one day to take up the dead. He granted it for two days; and in the course of these days he strengthened the houses near, and the Athenians their own position. He also summoned an assembly of the Toronæans, and said to them much the same message as to those in Acanthus, that it was not just either to consider those who had concerted with him the capture of the city to be worse than their fellows or traitors—for they did it neither to enslave their country, nor being induced by bribes, but for the good and freedom of the city—nor to think that those who had no part in the movement should not meet with the same treatment; for he had come

not to destroy either any city or any individual. 4. For this reason he had made the proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians, thinking that they were none the worse for their friendship to the other side: nor did he think, when they had made trial of the Lacedæmonians, that they would be less well disposed to them, but much more so, inasmuch as they acted with more justice, though at present they had been afraid through not having made the trial. 5. Further, he desired the whole body to prepare to be steady allies, and for the future to bear the blame of any fault they might commit: previously it was not his friends that were injured, but themselves rather, by others who were stronger, and there was reason for indulgence if they opposed him at all.

CXV.—1. Having spoken in this way and given them confidence, when the truce expired he made his attack upon Lecythus; and the Athenians defended themselves out of a sorry fort and from houses that had battlements. For one day they beat them off; but the following day, as an engine was about to be brought up against them on the side of their adversaries, from which they purposed to throw fire into their wooden breastworks, and as the army was already coming up—at the point where they thought they could best bring up the engine and where the defences were most assailable, they set up against them on a building a wooden tower, and carried up many amphoræ and casks of water and great stones; many men also mounted on it. 3. But the building, being made to bear too great a weight, suddenly broke down, and by the great noise that it made vexed those of the Athenians who were near and saw it more than it frightened them; but those who were at a distance, and especially those furthest away, thinking that the place was already taken at this point, rushed to their ships on the sea.

CXVI.—1. When Brasidas perceived that they were abandoning the battlements and saw what was going on, making a general assault with his army, he at once took the fort and put to the sword all that he found there. The Athenians passed over in merchant vessels and their ships to Pallene, evacuating the place in this way, (2) and

Brasidas—for there is in Lecythus a temple of Athene, and he happened to have made proclamation when he was about to make the attack that he would give thirty silver minæ to the man that mounted the wall first—thinking that the capture was effected by some way other than human, paid the thirty minæ to the Goddess for the use of the temple; moreover, having razed Lecythus to the ground and cleared it out, he gave it all up as sacred ground. For the rest of the winter he was putting in order the places that he held, and forming designs against the rest, and with the close of the winter the eighth year ended for the war.

CXVII.—1. But at the beginning of the spring of the following summer the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians at once agreed to a suspension of arms for a year, the Athenians thinking that Brasidas would no longer cause further defections from them before they had made their preparations without being disturbed, and at the same time, if it suited them, they might make an agreement for a longer term; and the Lacedæmonians, considering that the Athenians were afraid of what they really dreaded, and that when relief from trouble and hardship took place they would be more desirous, after making trial of it, both to be reconciled to them and, on condition of giving back the men to them, to make a treaty even for a longer period. 3. For they considered it of greater importance to recover the men, seeing that Brasidas was still prospering; and when he had achieved still further success and put matters on an equal footing for them, they were likely to be still deprived of the one, and while fighting with the others (the Athenians) on equal terms they might incur danger, and yet be successful (*or* by carrying on the contest with the rest on equal terms they had a chance even of winning). A suspension of arms was, therefore, made by them and their allies in the following words:

CXVIII.—1. ‘Respecting the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we resolve that anyone who wishes to consult it may do so without deceit and without fear, according to our hereditary customs; this is resolved by the Lacedæmonians and their allies who are present: they say that they will persuade the Bœotians and Phocians to the

best of their ability by sending a herald to them. 2. Respecting the treasures of the God, we resolve to take precautions, so as to find out those who act unjustly, rightly and justly observing our hereditary customs, both we and you and any of the others who wish, all observing our hereditary customs. 3. Respecting these, then, the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies resolved as above; and the following was resolved by the Lacedæmonians and the rest of their allies: if the Athenians shall make a truce, each party is to remain on their own territory as we now hold it, the garrison at Coryphasium remaining within Buphras and Tomeus; those in Cythera not meddling with the allies, neither we with them nor they with us; (4) and those in Nisæa and Minoa not crossing the road which leads from the gates as you come from the statue of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from the temple of Poseidon straight to the bridge leading to Minoa—nor are the Megareans and their allies to cross this road—holding also the island, which the Athenians seized, and neither party meddling with the other in either direction, and whatever possessions they have in Trœzen, and such as they agreed with the Athenians to surrender. 5. When making use of the sea, so much of it as is off their own coasts and their allies, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall sail not in a ship of war, but in another vessel worked by oars, carrying a freight that measures up to five hundred talents. A herald or embassy, with their attendants, as many as they think fit, shall have safe-conduct, whether by land or sea, when going or coming to Peloponnesus or to Athens respecting a conclusion to the war or a settlement of disputes. 6. Neither we nor you are to receive deserters in the course of this period, either a free man or a slave; you are to be ready to give satisfaction to us and we to you, according to our hereditary customs, settling disputed points by arbitration without going to war. 7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies have resolved upon these terms; but if anything seems to you to be either more honourable or more just than these, come to Lacedæmon and let us know; for neither the Lacedæmonians nor their allies will hold off from anything that you say in justice; but let those who

come, come with full powers, even as you request us. The truce shall be for a year. 8. The Demos made this resolution: Acamantis held the prytany, Phænippus was the scribe, Nikiades the epistates for the day. Laches moved, with good fortune to the Athenian people, to conclude an armistice, as the Lacedæmonians and their allies agree; and they agreed in the Demos that the armistice should be for a year, and that this day should begin it, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion. 9. In the course of this period ambassadors and heralds shall go to the respective cities and make proposals on what terms the conclusion of the war shall take place: that the generals and the prytanes should call an assembly, the Athenians should deliberate respecting the peace, in whatever way the embassy should be introduced concerning the conclusion of the war; and that the embassies who are present pledge themselves at once before the Demos that they will assuredly abide by the truce for the year.'

CXIX.—These terms the Lacedæmonians agreed upon (their allies also swore to them) with the Athenians and their allies, in the twelfth day of the month called at Lacedæmon Gerastius. Those who joined in the agreement and in the libations were of the Lacedæmonians the following—Taurus, the son of Echetimidas, Athenæus, the son of Periclidias, Philocharidas, son of Eryxidaïdas; of the Corinthians—Æneas, son of Ocytus, Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus; of the Sicyonians—Damotimus, son of Naucrates, Onasimus, son of Megacles; of the Megareans—Nicasus, son of Cecalus, Menecrates, son of Amphidorus; of the Epidaurians—Amphias, son of Eupaidas; of the Athenians—the generals Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias, son of Niceratus, Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. The armistice was made then as aforesaid, and in the course of it they were constantly going to conferences respecting the more important treaty.

CXX.—1. About the period in which they were going and coming, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. Now, the Scionæans say that they are Pellenæans from Peloponnesus, and that when their first settlers were sailing from Troy, they were carried to

land at this place by the storm which the Greeks met with, and settled there. 2. When they revolted, Brasidas sailed across to Scione by night, with a friendly trireme sailing in front, but he himself following at some distance in a small boat, so that if he fell in with any vessel larger than the boat, the trireme might defend him, but if another trireme of equal force came up thinking it would turn, not against the smaller vessel, but against the ship, and meanwhile he would get safe across. 3. Having crossed over and come to a conference with the Scionæans, he spoke as at Acanthus and Torone, saying further that they were in the highest degree worthy of praise, since Pallene, being cut off by the isthmus in consequence of the Athenians holding Potidæa, and being nothing else than islanders, they had of their own accord taken steps towards freedom, and had not, through want of boldness, waited for compulsion to be applied to them with regard to what was manifestly a peculiar advantage: it was also a proof that they would manfully endure anything else, even of the greatest straits, if matters should be arranged according to their notions; and he would consider them, in truth, most faithful friends of the Lacedæmonians, and would honour them in all other ways.

CXXI.—1. The Scionæans were elated at his words, and all alike taking courage, even those who before were not pleased at the intrigue that was going on, both made up their minds that they would take part in the war with spirit; and, among other honours with which they welcomed Brasidas, they crowned him, by public vote, with a golden crown as a liberator of Greece, and in private they placed wreaths on his head and greeted him as an athlete. 2. For the present, leaving them some troops as a garrison, he crossed back again, and not long afterwards he brought over a larger force, wishing, with their aid, to make an attempt on both Mende and Potidæa, thinking that the Athenians would come to the rescue as to an island, and wishing to anticipate them. Some communications also passed between him and these cities with a view to giving them up.

CXXII.—1. So he was intending to attack these cities,

but, meanwhile, those who were going about with the announcement of the armistice arrived in a trireme at his camp, of the Athenians Aristonymus, and of the Lacedæmonians Athenæus. The army crossed again to Torone, and they reported to Brasidas the terms of the truce, and all the allies of the Lacedæmonians on the borders of Thrace accepted what had been done. In the case of the rest, Aristonymus agreed; but perceiving, from a calculation of the days, that the Scionæans had revolted subsequently, he said that they would not be entitled to the benefit of the truce. 2. Brasidas made many objections, saying that they had revolted previously, and was for not giving up the city; and when Aristonymus made his report at Athens respecting them, the Athenians were at once ready to make an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedæmonians, sending ambassadors, said that they would transgress the terms of the truce, and they claimed the city, relying on what Brasidas said. Still they were ready to come to an arbitration about it. 3. The others were unwilling to run any risk by arbitration, but planned to send an expedition as quickly as they could, displaying their wrath, if even those in the islands should now indeed think proper to revolt from them, relying upon the strength of the Lacedæmonians by land, useless as it was. The truth respecting the revolt, too, was more as the Athenians claimed; for the Scionæans revolted two days later than the conclusion of the truce; and they immediately passed a decree, influenced by Cleon's opinion, to capture the Scionæans and put them to death; and though on other points they kept quiet, they went on with their preparations for this.

CXXIII.—1. In the meantime Mende revolted from them, a city in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. Brasidas accepted them, thinking that he was not doing wrong, in that they openly came over to him at the time of the armistice; for there were some points in which he, too, reproached the Athenians with violating the truce. 2. Wherefore, also, the Mendæans were the more courageous, from seeing that Brasidas' decision was prompt, drawing inferences, too, from the case of Scione, because he did not give it up, and, further, because the plotters among them, though few, did

not give up what they intended at the time above mentioned, but, fearing discovery for themselves, forced the majority to act against their judgment. 3. Directly the Athenians heard the news they were still more enraged, and made preparations against both the cities. Brasidas, expecting their attack, conveyed secretly to Olynthus, in Chalcidice, the wives and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans, and sent over to them five hundred hoplites of the Peloponnesians, and three hundred peltasts of the Chalcidians, with Polydamidas as commander of the whole; they, too, took measures in common for their own security, under the notion that the Athenians would speedily be upon them.

CXXIV.—1. In the meantime Brasidas and Perdiccas make a joint march into Lynceus against Arrhibæus for the second time. They had under their command, the one, the force of Macedonians under his dominion and hoplites from the Greeks who dwell in his country; the other, besides those of the Peloponnesians remaining to him on the spot, some Chalcidians and Acanthians, and from the other cities, each according to its ability. 2. The hoplite force of the Greeks amounted in all to about three thousand, and there were cavalry accompanying them of Macedonians with Chalcidians, in all nearly a thousand, and besides a great crowd of barbarians. On invading the territory of Arrhibæus they found the Lyncestians encamped against them, so they also took up a position against them. 3. The infantry held each a hill on either side, and there was a plain between them; into this the cavalry of both armies rode down and joined in a cavalry skirmish at first; afterwards, when the hoplites of the Lyncestians made the first advance from the hill along with their cavalry, and were ready to fight, Brasidas and Perdiccas, leading their men against them, also joined in the engagement and routed the Lyncestians; they put many to the sword, the rest escaped to the higher ground and kept quiet. 4. After this, having erected a trophy, they waited two or three days, staying for the Illyrians, who happened to be about coming to Perdiccas on hire; afterwards Perdiccas wished to advance against Arrhibæus' villages, and not to sit idle; but

Brasidas, being anxious about Mende, lest it should meet with some disaster from the Athenians' sailing against it before he arrived, as well as because the Illyrians were not there, was not over-ready, but wished rather to retreat.

CXXV.—In the meantime, while they were at variance, word was brought that the Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas and had joined Arrhibæus; so that by this time both thought good to retreat, on account of the fear they inspired, as being warlike men; yet, in consequence of their dispute, no decision was taken as to when they ought to set out. Night coming on, the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians being at once afraid, as is the wont of large armies to be panic-stricken without knowing why, thinking also that many times more were coming against them than really came, and that they were all but there, betaking themselves to a sudden flight, went home. Perdiccas at first was not aware of it, and when he knew it, they forced him to go away before seeing Brasidas, for they were encamped a good distance from one another. 2. At break of day, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone on in front, and that the Illyrians, with Arrhibæus, were intending to advance, he also brought together his hoplites into a square formation, received the light-armed crowd into the centre, and purposed to retreat. 3. He arranged his youngest men so as to sally out, wherever they made an attack upon them; and he himself with three hundred picked men, taking post in the rear while retreating, determined to withstand the first of their adversaries who should press hard upon them and repel them. Before the enemy were near, as well as he could in the hurry, he exhorted his soldiers as follows:

CXXVI.—1. 'If I did not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you feel some dismay in consequence of being left alone, and because those who are coming against us are barbarians and a numerous body, I should not, as I am doing, have attempted to impart instruction along with my exhortation; but now, looking at the defection of our allies and the number of our opponents, I shall try in a short reminder and exhortation to influence you in what is most important. 2. For it behoves you to be brave in warlike operations, not

on account of the presence of allies in each particular place, but by your own peculiar valour, and not to be scared at the multitude of the other side, since you come not from such states as theirs, in which it is not the many that rule the few, but rather the smaller number that rule the larger, having gained the supremacy by no other means than by being stronger in fighting. 3. As to barbarians whom you now fear through want of experience, you should learn to know, both from the struggle you have previously had with those of them who are Macedonians, and from which I conjecture and know by hearsay from others, that they will not be formidable ; for when there are points of real weakness in our enemies which give an impression of strength, the addition of sound instruction with regard to them tends to make the defenders more confident ; but when they have some substantial advantage, anyone will, perhaps, attack them more boldly from not knowing it beforehand. 4. Now, these men have a way of being about to do something which is alarming to men unacquainted with it : for they are terrible from numbers, striking to the eye, and intolerable by the greatness of their shouting ; and the shaking of their arms through the empty air has some show of threatening. But they are not of the kind to close with men who stand firm against all this ; for they have no military order so as to be ashamed of quitting any post when hard pressed, and their flight and advance, having an equal appearance of honour, leaves their bravery also unchallenged. 5. Their independent mode of fighting will most readily provide anyone with an excuse for running away without dishonour ; and they think the chance of frightening you away without danger a surer game than coming to close quarters ; for otherwise they would have adopted this rather than that. So you clearly see that all the alarm to be expected from them at first is in reality trifling, though disturbing to the eye and ear. 6. By withstanding this onslaught, and, when there is an opportunity, again retiring with order and discipline, you will come more speedily into a position of safety, and will know for the future that mobs of this kind, to men who receive their first onset, make a boast of their valour by threats from a distance, in being about to do something,

but when once men give way to them they show off their high spirit in pursuit, keen when there is no danger.'

CXXVII.—1. After giving this exhortation, Brasidas began to lead his army in retreat; the barbarians, seeing it, began to press upon him with a great shout and confusion, imagining that he was fleeing, and thinking to overtake and destroy him. But when the sallying parties met them wherever they fell upon them, and he himself, with the picked troops, resisted any close attack; moreover as they had withstood the first onset contrary to their expectation, and for the rest of the time when they attacked, the others met them and stood on the defensive, but when they were quiet began themselves to retreat; then indeed the main body of the barbarians kept aloof from the Greeks with Brasidas in the open country, but leaving some part to follow and make attacks upon them, the remainder advancing at full speed after the fugitives of the Macedonians, killed those they fell in with, and seized beforehand the pass into the country of Arrhibæus, which is a narrow one between two hills, knowing that Brasidas had no other way of retreat. When he was coming up to just the really difficult part of the road, they began to close round with the intention of cutting him off.

CXXVIII.—1. Perceiving this, he gave orders beforehand to the three hundred with him to go at a run, as quickly as each one could, without order, to the one of the two hills which he thought they might take more easily, and try to drive off from it the barbarians who were already on it, before the larger body destined to surround them could arrive there. They, making an attack, got the better of those upon the hill, and the larger part of the Greek force advanced more easily to it; for the barbarians were even frightened when they saw their men dislodged at that point from the higher ground, and no longer followed after the main body, thinking that they were already on the borders and had made good their escape. When Brasidas had got a firm hold of the heights, marching now in greater security, he arrived the same day first at Arnissa, in Perdiccas' dominions. 3. The soldiers, being angry of themselves at the Macedonians retreating before them, whenever

they fell in along the road with bullock carts belonging to them, or any utensil that had fallen out—as was likely to happen in a retreat at night-time and in a panic—unfastened the one and cut them up; of the others they took possession. 4. From this point first Perdiccas regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and for the future entertained a hatred for the Peloponnesians uncongenial to his judgment because of the Athenians, yet breaking away from his urgent interests, he was contriving in what way he could most quickly come to terms with the one party, and get clear from the other.

CXXIX.—1. On his retreat from Macedonia, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende, so he remained inactive where he was, as he thought he was now not strong enough to cross over to Pallene with assistance, but he kept watch over Torone. 2. For at about the same time as the affair at Lyncus the Athenians sailed against Mende and Scione—the expedition for which they were preparing—with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, a thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and some peltasts besides, from the allies on the spot. 3. Their general was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes. They set sail from Potidæa, and, landing at Posidonium, they advanced against the Mendæans. The latter, both themselves and three hundred of the Scionæans who had come to their aid, and the auxiliary force of Peloponnesians, in all seven hundred hoplites, with Polydamidas their commander, happened to be encamped outside the city on a hill, which gave them a strong position. 4. Nicias, with twenty Methonæans, a hundred light troops, sixty picked men of the Athenian hoplites and all the archers, attempted to approach them along a certain path on the hill, but had some of his men wounded and was not able to force a passage. 5. Nicostratus coming, with all the army, by another path from a greater distance, against the hill, and finding it difficult to approach, was utterly thrown into confusion, and the whole army of the Athenians came within a little of being conquered: so this day, as the Mendæans and their allies did not give in, the Athenians retreated and encamped,

and the Mendæans, when night came on, went back into the city.

CXXX.—1. The following day the Athenians, sailing round to the side facing Scione, both captured the suburb, and throughout the day ravaged the land, no one coming out against them, for there was some factious movement within the city; and the next night the three hundred Scionæans went away home. 2. The following day Nicias with half the army advanced to the borders of Scione laying waste the land the while; Nicostratus with the rest took post against the city at the upper gates, where they go towards Potidæa. Polydamidas, for it happened that the Mendæans and the auxiliaries had their arms laid within the walls at this point, drew up his troops in order of battle, and was exhorting the Mendæans to go forth. 3. Someone of those on the popular side replying to him in the spirit of faction, that he would not go out and that he did not wish to be at war, and he, as he replied, being seized by the hand and roughly handled, the people immediately taking up arms advanced in great wrath against the Peloponnesians and those who sided with them against themselves; falling upon them, they routed them as well by the suddenness of the fight, as in consequence of their alarm at the opening of the gates to the Athenians, for they thought that the attack was made upon them on some previous arrangement, so all that were not immediately put to the sword took refuge in the citadel, which also they held previously; but the Athenians—for already Nicias had returned and was close to the city—seeing the city Mende had not thrown open its gates by agreement, rushing in with all their army, sacked it as though they had taken it by force, and the generals scarcely restrained them so as to prevent the men from being put to the sword. 5. After this they ordered the Mendæans to administer the affairs of their city, as they had been accustomed to, bringing to trial among themselves any whom they thought to be chargeable with the revolt. They cut off the men in the acropolis by a wall to the sea on either side, and in addition established a guard. When they had effected the occupation of Mende, they went against Scione.

CXXXI.—1. The inhabitants, coming out against them with the Peloponnesians, established themselves strongly upon a hill in front of the city, which their opponents must take, or they would not have the means of walling them round; (2) but the Athenians, attacking them with open force and driving off in fight those that were upon it, formed an encampment and prepared for the circumvallation, after setting up a trophy. Not long after, while they were still engaged in the work, the auxiliaries, who were blockaded at Mende, forcing their way along the seacoast through the guard by night, arrived on the spot, and most of them made their escape through the army that was before Scione and got into it.

CXXXII.—1. Scione being now in course of investment, Perdiccas sent a herald to the generals of the Athenians and made a compact with the Athenians because of his animosity to Brasidas, regarding the retreat from Lyncus—having begun to treat immediately after it. 2. Now it happened at that time that Ischagoras, the Lacedæmonian, was intending to lead an army by land to Brasidas, but Perdiccas, as well at the expressed desire of Nicias, when he had come to an agreement, that he would give some evident proof of steadiness to the Athenians, as because he himself no longer wished the Peloponnesians to come into his country, wrought upon his friends in Thessaly, as he was always intimate with the leading men, and effectually stopped the preparation of the force, so that they did not even sound the Thessalians on the subject. 3. However, Ischagoras and Aminias and Aristeus themselves reached Brasidas' camp, being sent by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the state of affairs, and brought from Sparta, contrary to the usual practice, men from those among them who were of military age, with the view of establishing them as governors in the cities, instead of entrusting them to anyone that came in their way; so he installed Clearidas, the son of Cleonymus, at Amphipolis, and Pasitelas, the son of Hegesander, at Torone.


CXXXIII.—1. In the course of the same summer the Thebans razed the walls of the Thespians, charging them with favouring the Athenians—a step they had always

wished to take, but which now presented itself as easier, since in the battle with the Athenians the flower of their troops had perished. Also in the same summer the temple of Hera, in Argos, was burnt down, owing to Chrysis the priestess having placed a lighted lamp near the garlands and then dropped asleep, so that everything caught fire and was consumed without her knowing it. Chrysis fled that very night to Phlius in fear of the Argives; and they, according to the law previously enacted, appointed another priestess, named Phaënis. Now, Chrysis had reached the end of eight years of this war and the middle of the ninth, when she ran away. When the summer was just ending, Scione was invested entirely, and the Athenians, leaving a force to watch it, withdrew with the rest of their army.

CXXXIV.—1. During the following winter the course of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians was one of inaction on account of the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, with the allies on either side, had an engagement at Laodocium, in the territory of Orestheium, resulting in a disputed victory, for either side routed the wing opposed to them; both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. 2. However, when many had fallen on either side and the battle was nearly even, night cut short the action. The Tegeans bivouacking on the spot erected a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards set up a counter-trophy.

CXXXV.—1. At the end of the same winter, when it was drawing towards spring, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidæa; approaching by night and setting a ladder against the wall, he escaped notice so far, for the bell being carried along the wall, the setting of the ladder took place consequently at a vacant point, before the man who was passing it came up again. 2. Afterwards, however, as the sentinels perceived him directly before he got on to the wall, he led his force away with all speed, not waiting for it to be daylight. So the winter ended, and the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the account.

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